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This thesis considers and compares the standards against which Courts in South 
Africa review the exercise of private contractual power, on the basis of public policy, 
and the standards against which Courts in South Africa review the exercise of public 
power on the basis on rationality. This thesis undertakes this task in four main parts.  
 
Firstly, this thesis outlines important theoretical distinctions between legal and non-
legal powers, and private and public legal powers. In this regard, it is argued that what 
distinguishes a legal power from a non-legal power is the ability of the exercise of a 
legal power to in and of itself change another person’s legal situation. This differs from 
the exercise of a non-legal, or a “power of influence” which has natural, and no 
automatically legal consequences, and will only change another legal situation if other 
(natural) consequences come to bear first. In relation to the distinction between private 
and public powers, this thesis outlines the traditional justifications for the distinction 
drawn between private and public power. Drawing on Austin, this thesis proposes that 
a useful demarcation between public and private powers is that the latter, more 
peculiarly, regards persons determined specifically, while the former, more peculiarly, 
regards the public considered indeterminately.  
 
Secondly, this thesis unpacks and details the standard of rationality that a Court will 
hold the exercise of a public power to, and highlights how rationality in this respect is 
an objective standard that relates essentially to a power’s objective and whether or 
not the exercise of that power is related to that objective.  Thirdly, and drawing on the 
latest pronouncements of the Constitutional Court, this thesis details what public policy 
requires of the exercise of private contractual power and highlights how what it 
requires is a value laden and facts dependent inquiry.  
 
Fourthly, this thesis goes on to argue that the standard of public policy, to which 
exercises of private contractual power are held to, is a higher standard than the 
standard of rationality that the exercises of public power is held to. Furthermore, this 
thesis argues that while such a situation is justifiable, it may become unjustifiable 
should Courts begin to misconstrue the fundamental differences between a legal and 
non-legal, and private and public power. Finally, this thesis submits that another 
iv 
 
cornerstone of South Africa’s contract law, namely, that of privity of contract, may be 
a useful tool that Courts can use to keep balanced, on what this thesis outlines is a 
tightrope, that Courts have to walk in both having to imbue South Africa’s contract law 
with Constitutional values, while at the same time ensuring that the higher standard 
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I. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
 
 Introduction  
 
Consider the two-following fictitious scenarios:- 
 
Scenario 1, a contractual provision which provides that:  
 
X shall have the right to extend the Lease period by a further period as set out in 
clause 10 below, provided X gives Y written notice of its exercising of the option at 
least 6 months prior to the termination date.  
 
Scenario 2, a Minister’s decision to promulgate regulations to the effect that: 
 
The sale, distribution and transportation of any tobacco products and any alcoholic 
beverage is prohibited during the National State of Disaster which was declared by 
the President on 1 June 2020.  
 
Traditionally, at least, the notion that X, in circumstances where it failed to properly 
exercise its option, would be able to approach a Court and ask the Court to essentially 
second-guess Y’s enforcement of the contractual provision in Scenario 1 would for the 
most part, be a non-starter. 1 In comparison, it would be quite ordinary for the citizenry 
in a constitutional democracy to assume (and perhaps demand) that Minister’s 
decision in Scenario 2 get tested in a Court against the prescripts of the relevant 
constitution, and if necessary, the Court would be more than entitled to set the 
Minister’s actions in Scenario 2 aside. This is because traditionally it has been thought 
that, for the most part, it is only the exercises of public power that can, and ought, to 
be subject to some form of judicial review. It would also be fair to proffer that the 
citizenry may very well hold the view that even if a Court could interfere in Y’s 
enforcement of the contractual provision in Scenario 1, it would be on significantly 
 
1 See Dale Hutchison ‘The Nature and Basis of Contract’ in Dale Hutchison, Chris-James Pretorius and Tkajie 
Naude (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2017) 25 – 62 at 52 – 53.   
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stricter grounds than a Court would be entitled to interfere with the Minister’s decision 
in Scenario 2. The purpose of this submission is to indicate that it may not necessarily 
be so. Consider however, what the position may be if X was a large tobacco and/or 
alcohol distributor and the (common cause) effect of Y adopting the position it adopts 
is to preclude indefinitely a certain portion of the citizenry from accessing tobacco 
and/or alcohol. It would be safe to assume that in such a situation at least a part of the 
deprived citizenry may very well feel that a Court ought to interfere with X and Y’s 
contractual arrangement and prevent Y from adopting the position it intends to adopt. 
Anecdotally, the deprived citizenry may feel that Y cannot, on whim, interfere and/or 
prevent them from exercising whatever rights they believe they have in relation to 
accessing and consuming alcoholic/tobacco products. They may believe that should 
Y do so, it should be for a Court to step in an tell Y how it can and cannot act, and 
reprimand Y for taking a decision which interferes with whatever rights they believe 
they, the deprived citizenry, have.  
 
In theory, there are a spectrum of possible positions that a legal system may adopt in 
approaching the question of how Y’s exercise of its contractual power or its 
enforcement of its contractual entitlements may be reviewed, if, of course, at all. On 
the one hand, and at one extreme of the spectrum, a legal system could adopt the 
position that parties to a contract are only to be held to their self-imposed standards, 
and nothing else need be considered2 when determining whether the manner in which 
a party to a contract exercises its private contractual power is lawful or not. 3 On the 
other hand, and at the other extreme end of the spectrum, a legal system could adopt 
the position that a party’s exercise of its private contractual power can be totally 
evaluated and only held to be lawful if it is thought to be normatively acceptable in the 
particular circumstances.4  
 
The primary endeavour of this submission is to compare the standard that a Court will 
second-guess the exercise of public power to, on the basis of rationality, with the 
 
2 Assuming of course that there is compliance with the contract and the party is acting fraudulently or dishonestly. 
3 See Alister Price and Andrew Hutchison ‘Judicial Review of Exercises of Contractual Power: South Africa’s 
Divergence from the Common Law Tradition’ (2015) 79 Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationals 
Privatrecht 822 at 823.  
4 Ibid.  
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standard that a Court will second-guess the exercise of private power to, on the basis 
of public policy.  
 
 Brief Outline  
 
This submission will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the idea of a “legal” versus 
a non-legal power, and the distinction between private and public powers. Chapter 2 
outlines some of the reasons, both historically and as a matter of ideological 
persuasion, that jurisdictions may, or may not, hold the distinction between public and 
private powers to be important and justifiable. Chapter 3 examines the manner in 
which courts review the exercises of public power on rationality grounds. In doing so, 
what exactly rationality entails will be assessed. Chapter 4 provides an overview of 
the manner in which the Constitutional Court has now confirmed exercises of private 
contractual power and contractual provisions are to be tested against the threshold of 
public policy. Chapter 5 then endeavours to compare the standard that a Court will 
hold the exercise of public power to on rationality grounds, and the exercise of private 
power to on public policy grounds. The argument advanced in Chapter 5 is that the 
Courts justifiably hold the exercise of private power on public policy grounds to higher 
standards than they do the exercise of public power on rationality grounds. Chapter 5 
then assesses and compares the reasons why Courts may or may not seek to “defer” 
to the various power wielders. Chapter 5 then details how the higher threshold that 
Courts hold the exerciser of private power to may become unjustifiable, and argues 
that Courts have a tightrope to walk by having to ensure that contract law is imbued 
with Constitutional values while ensuring that the high standards of conduct that 
contract law imposes on private parties does not become unjustifiable relative to the 
standard that Courts hold the exercises of public power to on rationality grounds. 
Chapter 5 concludes  with a suggestion of how Courts may be able to reason on the 
basis of, or deploy the concept of, privity of contract, to ensure that they do not push 
the limits of the justifications for why exercises of private powers can be held to a 
higher standard than the exercise of public powers (on public policy, and rationality 






II. CHAPTER TWO: POWERS – LEGAL AND OTHER 
POWERS AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LEGAL POWERS  
 
  Legal and non-legal powers 
 
Both “legal powers” and “non-legal powers” have the ability to change any theoretical 
“legal situation” (i.e. any rights, duties, privileges, obligations and so on, that may be 
applicable to any situation).5 However, the way in which the exercise of a legal power 
may change a theoretical legal situation is different to the way in which the exercise of 
a non-legal power may change a theoretical legal situation.6 Consider the following 
Example, made up of two instances: 
 
In instance one, A and B enter into a contract whereby B is to supply A with 
specific services. B, therefore, has an obligation to provide those specific 
services to A. A then cancels the contract in the terms of the contract’s 
cancellation clause, and thus B no longer has an obligation to provide A with 
those specific services that it would have had to provide to A, if it was still bound 
by the contract.  
 
In instance two, A and B are bound by the same contract as in instance one, 
but C convinces A that it can offer A a better deal than B can, and therefore A 
cancels its contract with B to enter into a contract with C.  
 
In instance one, A exercises a legal power which affects the legal situation of B. 
Whereas, in instance two, C exercises a non-legal power which affects the legal 
situation of B.7 Thus, both A and C can change the legal situation of B. Although it is 
easy to see that prima facie A and C do not change B’s legal situation in the exact 
same way, the manner in which A and C change B’s legal situation is not easy to 
 
5 Christopher Essert ‘Legal Powers in Private Law’ (2015) 21 LEG 136 at 137.  
6 Ibid.  
7 This example assume that C’s actions are lawful.  
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accurately distinguish. Indeed, the difference in how the exercise of either a legal or a 
non-legal power affects a particular legal situation, or as put by Essert, the “central 
distinction”8, is difficult to pin-point for at least two reasons. 
 
The first reason is that it is not always as easy as it was in instance one and two to 
determine whether a legal a non-legal power has been exercised. For example, 
assume that in the Example, B only represents to A that it will provide A with specific 
services, which representation A relies on. This reliance by A may change the legal 
situation between A and B because should B fail to deliver the specific services, B 
may be subject to some kind of liability in favour of A. 
 
The second reason is simply that the use of the English word “power” can confuse 
one’s attempts to draw the central distinction. The term “power” is, and would 
understandably be, commonly used to describe both situations, which muddies any 
distinction between the nature of the two different kinds of power being exercised by 
A and C. Thus, conceptually it is hard to determine how the exercise of each power 
may change the relevant legal situation, as for the most part, the two “powers” are 
seen as the same thing: “power”.  
 
Although making the central distinction is, for at least the two reasons listed above, 
not easy to make, the difference in how the exercise of a legal and a non-legal power 
affects any legal situation can be determined when one considers the position of C 
more closely.  
 
It would be uncontentious to hold that C is exercising a non-legal power. 9  C is 
exercising what Joesph Raz terms “power as influence”10 as opposed to a legal power. 
When the manner in which C’s exercise of its non-legal power changes the relevant 
legal situation is more closely examined, it is apparent that the change in legal situation 
brought about by C’s exercise of its non-legal power is brought about causally. This 
means that C needs to cause other things to happen in order for B’s legal situation to 
 
8 Essert op cit note 5 at 140. 
9 This is not to say that what C is doing is unlawful, or that C does have a right to undertake the action that it does.  
10 Joseph Raz Practical Reason and Norms 2ed (1999) 103. 
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change, or put differently, C needs to do something which results in a chain of events 
occurring which then leads to an eventual change in B’s legal situation.  
 
Drawing on H.L.A Hart’s commentary on the works of Jeremy Bentham,11 when C 
exercises the power that it wields, its “power as influence”, C’s actions cause natural 
effects, not legal effects. It is only if these later natural effects caused by C actually 
occur, will there be a change in the relevant legal situation: it is only if C successfully 
convinces A to do something will there be a change in B’s legal situation. Whereas if 
A exercises its legal power, such exercise will, or rather can, on its own, have a legal 
normative effect, and change B’s legal situation. Thus, the change in the situation 
affected by A (the legal-power wielder) is not causally dependent on another act. 
Simply put, changes in any relevant legal situation brought about through the 
exercises of legal powers are not brought about causally, and are not dependent on 
any natural causation effects.12  
 
Raz also recognises this point made by Hart and proposes that for the exercise of a 
power to be regarded as a normative power (for our purposes, a legal power), that act 
must change the norm (for our purposes, the legal situation) sought to be changed, 
normatively and not merely causally.13 An act does this, according to Raz, if it is the 
mere result of the act that determines the application (or change) of the norm.  
Whereas, according to Raz, an act affects a norm causally if it is a consequence of 
that act which determines the norm’s applicability or change, and not merely the act 
itself. 14 
 
Thus, although making the central distinction is not always easy, one can discern legal 
powers from non-legal powers by focusing on the exercise of each powers’ effect and, 
in particular, its causality. As simply put by Essert, “while we can change our legal 
 
11 H.L.A Hart ‘Bentham on Legal Powers’ (1972) 81 5th Issue Yale Law Journal 799 at 820.  
12 Essert op cit note 5 at 142.  
13 Michael G. Pratt ‘Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations’ (2007) 26 No.6 Law and Philosophy 531 at 
540.  
14 Ibid. Raz also recognizes a second necessary condition that must be met if the exercise of a power is to be 
regarded as the exercise of a normative or legal power which is that the exercise of that power must only be 
recognized as affecting legal norms and those norms’ application, if it is desirable to enable people to affect those 
norms and their application. This second necessary condition is not relevant for current purposes.  
7 
 
situations causally in any manner of ways, legal powers are distinctive in that they 
uniquely allow us to bring about legal changes non-causally.”15 
 
According to Hohfeld, strictly fundamental legal relations are by their nature sui generis 
and are therefore, by their nature, hard to define, and most attempts at a formal 
definition are unsatisfactory. 16 Therefore, Hohfeld proposes that the most promising 
way of examining strict legal relations is by examining all the various legal relations in 
a scheme of oppositions and correlatives. 17  In such a scheme a legal power’s 
opposite is a “legal disability”, and its correlative, a “legal liability”.18 When a change 
in any legal relation occurs (i.e. when any legal situation changes) which is the result 
of some superadded fact or group of facts under the volitional control of a person, that 
person whose volitional control is paramount is said to have the legal power. 19 Or, as 
usefully described by Cockrell20 if one is to say that X has a legal power vis-à-vis 
person Y, it means that X has the competence to alter the legal position of Y, and Y 
labours under the correlative liability that its legal position is susceptible to change (for 
better or for worse) by X.  
 
The distinction between what a legal power is, and what a “power of influence” is, is 
an important one, because, as will be argued later, should Courts allow the exercises 
of “powers of influence” to be reviewed, as opposed to exercises of strictly legal 
powers, the higher standard that Courts hold the exercise of private power to (on public 
policy grounds) relative to the exercises of public power (on rationality grounds) will 
become unjustifiable.  
 
 Public and Private Powers 
 
It is necessary to outline the difference between a “private” and a “public” power. This 
is so as when the manner in which the exercises of the two kinds of powers can be 
 
15 Essert op cit note 5 at 145.  
16 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applies in Judicial Reasoning’ 23 Yale 
Law Journal 16 at 30.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Alfred Cockrell ‘Second-guessing the Exercise of Contractual Power of Rationality Grounds’ (1997) Acta Juridica 
26 at 26.  
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reviewed is examined and compared, it will be important to give consideration to both 
what the fundamental and conceptual differences between the two kinds of powers 
are, and why there has, historically and traditionally, at least, been such an important 
distinction drawn in between the two kinds of power.  
 
The distinction, or at least people drawing the distinction between public and private 
law, and therefore the difference between public and private legal powers, has 
appeared since at least the time of the Corpus Juris Civilis, 21 wherein Ulpian said 
“Public law is that which regards the government of the Roman Empire; private law, 
that which concerns the interest of individuals.”22  
 
Austin notes two general difficulties within the subject of trying to determine what the 
true nature of, and the distinction between, public and private law are. The first, with 
regard to public law, is that certain aspects of public law which regard the constitution 
and the manner in which the Sovereign exercises its sovereign power, are not positive 
law, but are positive morality or ethical maxims. 23 The second is the difficulty in 
“drawing the line of demarcation by which the conditions of private persons are 
severed from the conditions of political subordinates”.24 This difficulty arises as both 
the rights and duties of private persons (such as rights one may have in terms of a 
contract they have entered into) and political subordinates (such as judges, ministers 
or other officers of justice) are creations of the same author, being the State or 
Sovereign. 25 The only possible demarcation which can possibly be drawn according 
to Austin is that when a condition is private, the powers vested in the person who may 
bear it “more peculiarly regard persons determined specifically” and when the 




21 John Henry Merryman ‘The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law’ (1968) 17 
Journal of Public Law 3 at 5.  
22 Translation taken from Sanders I.1.1.4 as used by Cockrell in Alfred Cockrell “‘Can You Paradigm?’ – Another 
Perspective on the Public Law/Private Law Divide” (1993) Acta Juridica 227 at 227.  
23 John Campbell Austin ‘Lectures of Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law’ 3ed (1874) at 771 to 772.  
24 Austin op cit note 23 at 773.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Austin op cit note 23 at 774.  
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A large force behind the distinction between public and private law has been 
ideological. 27 The codified civil laws of France, Austria, Italy and Germany in the 19th 
century – which gave expression to the dominant currents of economic, social and 
political thought of those places in 17th and 18th centuries – had as dominant concepts 
individual private property and the freedom of contract. 28 As a consequence of the 
rationalistic and secular thinking, jurists proposed that the fundamental rights of 
property and contract were guarantees of individual rights against intrusion by the 
state.29  Private law was consequently seen as the area of law wherein the only 
function of the state was to recognise and enforce private rights. The attempt to 
distinguish private law from public law was therefore an attempt to establish and 
triumph the autonomy of the individual and to fashion a private preserve for the 
individual so as to guarantee the unfettered activity of juristic persons in the market. 
30 Private law is therefore, another form of the triumph of contract. 31 There were many 
assumptions which accompanied this attitude towards private law, most of which 
would not hold true today, such as a view that the main actors in the economy are 
private individuals, and an assumption that neither large corporations, labour unions, 
nor governments were to broadly participate in society. 32 A further accompanying 
assumption which would not hold today was that the legal playing field only had two 
actors, being the state and the private individual, both of which had their own legal 
domain: public law for the state, and private law for the private individual. 33  
 
There are many other ideological persuasions which could influence the way in which 
a certain jurisdiction may conceive of the distinction between private law and public 
law. Jurisdictions which have a more collectivist or communal outlook, who believe 
that the interests of the collective ought to trump those of the individual, may conceive 
of the private laws of contract and property as hinderances, and may accordingly adopt 
a view that all law is public law. Jurisdictions which have experienced totalitarian or 
authoritarian governments may want to reject a principle that the state is superior to 
 
27 John Henry Merryman op cit note 21 at 11 to 13.  
28 John Henry Merryman op cit note 21 at 11.  
29 Ibid. 
30 John Henry Merryman op cit note 21 at page 11 and fn 33.  
31 John Henry Merryman op cit note 21 at page 11 - 13.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
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the individual, and accordingly do away with the distinction between public and private 
law so to subject the state to the stricter principles found in private law. 34  
 
As has can be seen from the above, the distinction between public law and private 
law, and therefore, public and private powers, is one which is vexed and intertwined 
with any jurisdiction’s history and socio-political ideology. However, there are at least 
two themes which emerge in the trail of the classic Roman distinction given above, 
which essentially holds that public law governs the relations between individual and 
the state and private law concerns the relationships between private individuals.35 The 
first is that public law and private law are distinguished and given different treatment 
because the relationship between the state and private individuals is one between 
fundamentally unequal parties, whereas, there is at least an assumption that private 
law is concerned with persons who have equal power. Indeed, it is this theme of there 
being an inequality in the relative power between the two concerned parties which 
seems to be the most commonly drawn by contemporary public law authors. Devenish 
et al36 state that “private law regulates relationships on the basis of equality, whereas 
public law regulated relationships between government organs inter se or between 
government organs and individuals on the basis of subordination.” Wiechers states 
that “public law governs unequal relationships of authority between government 
organs and subjects, and … private law governs equal voluntary relationships” and 
that according to a broader view, public law governs public interests whereas private 
law governs private interests.” 37  The second theme suggests that public law by 
definition intrudes into the political realm, whereas private law is absolutely divorced 
from it.38  As stated by Hoexter, “administrative law has a close relationship with 




34 Ibid.  
35 Cockrell op cit note 22 at 227.  
36 GE Devenish, K Govender and DH Hulme ‘Administrative law and justice in South Africa’ (2001) at 22.  
37 Marinus Wiechers ‘Administrative Law’ (1985) translated from the Afrikaans by Gretchen Carpenter at 8.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Cora Hoexter ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ 2ed (2012) at 8  
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III. CHAPTER THREE: THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF 
PUBLIC POWER ON THE BASIS OF RATIONALITY 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) regulates 
public power in numerous ways. As put by the Constitutional Court in President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others v SARFU and others (“SARFU”)40:  
 
“The exercise of public power is regulated by the Constitution in different ways. 
There is a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary which determines who may exercise power in particular spheres. An 
overarching bill of rights regulates and controls the exercise of public power, 
and specific provisions of the Constitution regulate and control the exercise of 
particular powers.” 
 
This contribution only focuses on one of these ways, being that of judicial review.41 
Generally, there are two bases upon which a court in Constitutional South Africa will 
review the exercise of public power. The first basis that a Court may base its review 
on are the requirements which, as will be indicated below, are implicit and explicit in 
the Constitution that any exercise of public power must meet all of the requirements 
of the Rule of Law, the principle of legality, and must be rational. The second basis is 
the invoking of section 33 of the Constitution which inter alia guarantees everyone the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. However, 






40 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 132.  
41 There are many other means by which exercises of public power can be regulated, such as, to name but only a 
few: by means of internal administrative appeals; alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and legislative 
controls and oversight, through national, provincial and local legislative bodies. Hoexter, in relation to other means 
of regulating exercises of public power, goes so far as to say: “political and representative controls such as public 
participation may guide and shape the exercise of administrative action far more effectively than review” Hoexter 




 The Rule of Law, the Principle of Legality and Rationality  
 
Right from the adoption of the Constitution, it has been held that any exercise of public 
power must comply with the tenets of the rule of law, including the principle of legality.  
This is to be expected as section 1 (c) of the Constitution states that South Africa is 
one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the values of inter alia the supremacy of 
the constitution and the rule of law. In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others42 (“Fedsure”) the 
Constitutional Court described the rule of law as expressing the principle of legality, 
or, put differently, the principle of legality is a part of the doctrine of the rule of law, 43 
a value upon which South Africa is based.44 The Constitutional Court further held that 
the principle of legality generally expressed the idea that the exercise of public power 
is only legitimate where lawful,45  and was fundamental to the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“interim Constitution”).46  
 
In SARFU the Constitutional Court held that just because the President was exercising 
a power conferred upon him by the Constitution, and his exercise of that power was 
not administrative action, did not mean that “there are no constraints upon it”, but there 
were in fact “significant constraints” on the exercise of such power, which constraints 
were to be found throughout, and implicit in, the Constitution47. The Constitutional 
Court further went on to reiterate what it held in Fedsure and stated that the President’s 
exercises of power are constrained by the principle of legality, and “as is implicit in the 





42 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para 56.  
43 Cora Hoexter “The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 
165 at 181.  
44 At para 57, wherein the Constitutional Court points to section 1 (c) of the Constitution.  
45 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) (“Fedsure”). See too Hoexter op cit note 39 at 160.  
46 Fedsure supra note 45 at para 58. Importantly, section 1 (2) of the interim Constitution, upon which the court 
made this finding was not amended in the Constitution.  
47 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (1) 
SA 1 (CC) at para 148 (“SARFU”).  
48 SARFU supra note 47 at para 148.  
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The Constitution dictates that every exercise of public power should not be arbitrary 
and should be rational. 49  As described by Price, this principle, which has been 
developed by the Constitutional Court, sets as a necessary condition to any legally 
valid exercise of public power, rationality or non-arbitrariness. 50  Accordingly, 
rationality or non-arbitrariness act as constitutional thresholds that every exercise of 
public power must pass to be legally valid. Albeit what rationality may require will be 
discussed below, as a general proposition when determining whether exercises of 
public power are rational, courts must determine whether or not the conduct in 
question is rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose.51 That this is the 
case has been recognised by the Constitutional Court right from its inception. 52  
 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others53 Chaskalson P stated the 
following, now often cited, paragraphs:  
 
“It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the 
executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they 
are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in 
order to pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the 
executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply with this requirement. 





“The question whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which 
the power was given calls for an objective enquiry.”55 
 
49 Alistair Price “The content and justification of rationality review” (2010) 25 SAPL 346 at 346.  
50 Alistair Price op cit note 49.   
51 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 347.  
52 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 156.  
53 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).  
54 At para 85.  
55 At para 86.  
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This rationality, Chaskalson P went on to state, is a minimum threshold requirement 
applicable to the exercise of all public power, and conduct which fails to pass this 
minimum threshold is inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution and is 
accordingly unlawful. 56  
In  Albutt  v  Centre  for  the  Study  of  Violence  and  Reconciliation  and other57 the 
Constitutional Court stated:  
“The executive has a wide discretion in selecting the means to achieve its 
constitutionally permissible objectives. Courts may not interfere with the means 
selected simply because they do not like them, or because there are other more 
appropriate means that could have been selected. But, where the decision is 
challenged on the grounds of rationality, courts are obliged to examine the 
means selected to determine whether they are rationally related to the objective 
sought to be achieved. What must be stressed is that the purpose of the enquiry 
is to determine not whether there are other means that could have been used, 
but whether the means selected are rationally related to the objective sought to 
be achieved. And if objectively speaking they are not, they fall short of the 
standard demanded by the Constitution.” 
In Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Western Cape 
Province and Another58 the Constitutional Court, while quoting from Prinsloo v Van 
der Linde and Another,59 held and clarified, firstly, that a person seeking to impugn the 
exercise of a public power on the basis of rationality cannot rely on the fact that there 
may have been a better way for the public power wielder to achieve their objective, 
and, secondly, that as long as there is a rational relationship between the method and 
the object, it is irrelevant that the objective could have been achieved in a different 
way. 60 In Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of 
 
56 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 90.  
57 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC).  
58 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC).   
59 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC).  
60 Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Western Cape Province and Another 2002 (3) SA 
265 (CC) at para 41.  
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South Africa and Others61 the Constitutional Court held that provided the exercise of 
a public power serves a legitimate public purpose, “the political merits or demerits” are 
of no concern to the reviewing Court. 62  
In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others63, the 
High Court remarked that rationality review is “really concerned with the evaluation of 
a relationship between means and ends” and its aim is not to determine whether some 
means will achieve the purpose better than others, but only whether the means 
employed are rationally related to the purpose for which the power was conferred. 64  
Lastly, and importantly, the test for rationality is an objective one 65  and the 
requirement of rationality is not directed at a determination of whether or not the 
impugned exercise of public power is fair or reasonable. 66 
Although the rationality threshold appears prima facie to be straight forward, what it 
exactly requires is not always clear. This lack of clarity is occasioned by the 
“metaphorical requirement” of there being a rational connection or relationship 
between the exercise of a public power and a purpose. 67 Price proffers that what 
rationality review requires is a two-pronged assessment of, firstly, what a law’s 
purpose is and secondly, what the actual or probable effect of the law is. 68 In relation 
to the first prong of the test, oftentimes determining what the purpose of the power-
conferring law is, will be straight forward and merely entail some statutory 
interpretation.69 In other situations what the purpose of the power-conferring law is 
may be more difficult to determine, and the court may have to exercise some judicial 
discretion. Price suggests that a preferable alternative would be to hold that the 
purpose of the power-conferring law would only be legitimate if it is consistent with all 
 
61 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC).  
62 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (5) SA 
171 (CC) at para 63.  
63 (2016) 3 All SA 537 (WCC).  
64 At para 85.  
65 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) (“Motau”) at para 69.  
66 Law Society of South Africa and others v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at para 35.  
67 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 354.  
68 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 354.  
69 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 354. The court will also have the benefit of the power wielder’s submissions as to 
what the purpose of the power is. The court can accept or reject that submission, and/or accord it whatever weight 
it deems fit. But nonetheless it will have the benefit the power holder at least submitting to it what it believes the 
purpose is.   
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other legal and Constitutional constraints including the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution’s objective normative value system. 70 In relation to the second prong of 
the test, the court is called upon to make a causative and somewhat speculative71 
determination, which is to determine what the effect of the exercise of the public power 
will be. The court will need to determine whether the effect of the exercise of the public 
power serves the determined purpose sufficiently well so as to be held to have a 
rational connection to it.72 Price submits that should the exercise of the public power 
achieve its determined purpose symbolically (or, put differently, if it has intrinsic value), 
or brings about its ends (the realization of its purpose) as a matter of empirical 
causality (or, put differently, if it has instrumental value), it will meet the relevant 
threshold of connection/relationship to its determined purpose, and therefore be 
rational. 73 Courts therefore need to apply an “evaluative purpose requirement” and a 
“vague effect requirement.” 74 
Albeit exercises of executive action need to be lawful, rational and done in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution, exercises of executive action need not be 
procedurally fair. 75 However, exercises of executive action need to be procedurally 
rational. 76 Procedural rationality “is about testing whether, or ensuring that there is a 
rational connection between the exercise of power in relation to both process and the 




70 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 354.  
71 It is speculative as the court will need to, at least in part, determine what the effect will/may be in the future. The 
court is not seeking to determine what the effect has been.  
72 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 355.  
73 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 356.  
74 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 356. 
75 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) at para 78.  
76 Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2019 (3) SA 30 
(CC) at para 64 (“Law Society of South Africa”).  
77 Law Society of South Africa supra note 76 at para 64. 
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IV. CHAPTER FOUR: JUDICIAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
CONTRACTUAL POWER ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 
 
As I have stated above, the focus of this submission is to compare the manner in which 
a Court will review or second-guess the exercise of private contractual power on public 
policy grounds, with the manner in which a Court will review or second-guess the 
exercise of public power on rationality grounds. By a “private contractual power” I 
mean a power that a private person has and exercises in terms of a contract. There 
are, of course, other means by which a Court may review the exercise of private 
contractual powers. For example, Courts may review the manner in which a party 
exercises a private contractual discretionary power in accordance with the principle of 
arbitrium boni viri, which requires that a party must exercise the discretion that they 
have in terms of a contract reasonably. 78 However, going beyond public policy is out 
of the remit of this submission and public policy is the substantive ground upon which 
exercises of private contractual power have been sought to be reviewed that has 
received the most attention both in the literature and in the case law.  
 
a. Necessary historical observations and theoretical underpinnings  
 
At this juncture, and prior to examining the manner in which a court will review 
exercises of private contractual powers on public policy grounds, it is worth outlining 
some important historical, theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings of both 
contracts, and contract law in general, and South Africa’s historical conception thereof.  
Such an examination is useful, as these underpinnings can provide a useful basis 
upon which a better and more complete understanding and conception of South 
Africa’s modern contract law can be built. Accordingly, a better critique of the manner 
in which courts approach the reviewing of exercises of private contractual power can 
be provided.  
 
 
78 See in general Alistair Price and Andrew Hutchison op cit note 3.  
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 Individualism – the permeating principle  
 
The political and economic philosophies of the nineteenth century, being those of 
laissez-faire liberalism and, perhaps, more fundamentally, individualism, have 
permeated and informed the cornerstones of South Africa’s law of contract. 79 It would 
be uncontroversial to state that South Africa’s law of contract is, as a general 
proposition, individualistic in its nature and has as much of its foundation 
individualism80, and is predisposed to the doctrines and values which emanate from 
individualism.81  
 
Individualism conceives of persons as atomistic units, only joined to other persons by 
bonds that are totally contingent, 82 who all have exclusive control of their private 
domain of autonomy, which private domain is “staked out on the perimeter by the 
claims of rights”. 83  Individualism further accepts, as a given, a world where 
independent individuals are all encouraged to pursue their own self-interest 
“rigorously”, and a consideration or sensitivity for the interests of others falls outside 
of the aims of the “way of life” posited by individualism.84  Save to the extent that 
individuals are to obey the rules and norms that make it possible to co-exist with other 
self-interested individuals, individuals are entirely self-reliant, and individuals conduct 
themselves in a manner which conforms to the belief that all other individuals in the 
community are motivated entirely by self-interest. 85 Individualism also holds that the 
law cannot impose upon individuals as a group, the liability of shared profits or loss.86 
 
 
79 Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 41. C-J Pretorius ‘Individualism, Collectivism and the Limits of Good Faith’ 
(2003) 66 THRHR 638 at 642.  
80 See AJ Barnard-Naude ‘“Oh what a tangled web we weave…” Hegemony, Freedom of Contract, Good Faith and 
Transformation – Towards a Politics of Friendship in the Politics of Contract’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 
155 at 162 at 166 – 167, Alfred Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract’ (1992) 109 
SALJ 40 at 45, C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642. This is not to suggest that South African contract law has 
traditionally never embraced any kind of collectivism (collectivism is discussed later).  As Cockrell pointed out in 
1992, there were (and still are) instances wherein South Africa’s contract law can only be understood in terms a 
communitarian vision. Those instances, however, were just not privileged. Of course, the extent to which South 
African contract law may lean towards individualism or collectivism, will be a topic for a lengthy discussion later.  
81 C-J Pretorius 102 ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability (4): Towards a Composite Theory of Contract’ (2006) 69 
THRHR 97 at 102, particularly at footnote 52.  
82 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 41.  
83 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42.  
84 Barnard-Naude op cit note 80 at 164.  
85 Barnard-Naude op cit note 80 at 164. 
86 Barnard-Naude op cit note 80 at 164. 
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The ideology of individualism can be seen to comprise of two main, distinct albeit 
supportive, aspects, namely: market-ideology, and individualist ideology. 87 
Accordingly, the ideology of individualism has been referred to as the ideology of 
“market-individualism”. 88  This indicates that the capitalist idea of the market and 
individualism are “heavily invested in each other.” 89 
 
According to market-ideology, the function of contract law is the facilitation of 
competitive exchange. 90 Contract law does this by establishing the ground rules by 
which competitive exchange can be conducted. 91 Save for parties observing matters 
of procedural fairness, parties must be allowed to contract and bargain with minimal 
intervention, and their bargains must be adhered to. 92 Furthermore, market ideology 
promotes certain values and principles, the first being that the security of transactions 
must be protected. 93 This entails that contract law should both protect a person’s 
reasonable assumption that they have entered into a contract and ensure that a party 
receives the performance that they bargained for. 94  Secondly, market ideology 
promotes the principle that the ground rules of contract must be clear, so as to enable 
the parties bargaining to plan their exchanges with the requisite caution, and thus, 
certainty is of primary importance. 95 Thirdly, market ideology posits that, bearing in 
mind contract law’s function (being the facilitation of competitive exchange), contract 
law should accommodate, and its rules should not fall out of line with, commercial 
practice. 96 Lastly, market ideology holds that many of the rules that concern contract 
formation are based on convenience, merely because contract law is concerned with 
avoiding inconvenience in the market.97 Individualism assumes a world of traders who 
meet only briefly on the market, where they engage in discrete transactions and 
exchanges. 98  
 
 
87 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639.  
88 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639. 
89 Barnard-Naude op cit note 80 at 164. 
90 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639. 
91 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639.  
92 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639.  
93 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 639. 
94 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
95 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640.  
96 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
97 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
98 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 41. 
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The second aspect of individualism, individualistic ideology, has as its focus, the 
voluntary choice of individual persons to enter into the market place, choose their 
fellow contractors, conclude contracts and bargain on their own terms and honour 
them. 99 Judicial intervention into contractual relationships should be curtailed so as 
to ensure that parties have the utmost freedom to strike their bargain, 100 and the role 
of the state is limited to a “nightwatchman function” whereby the state protects each 
person’s area of individual autonomy from uninvited intrusion.101  Dominant ideas of 
individualistic ideology are individual autonomy and self-reliance.102 Preference is, 
accordingly, for free will and subjective intention,103 and other people are viewed with 
distrust, since there is an “omnipresent danger that one’s personal liberty will be 
restricted when rival spheres of autonomy collide.” 104  Value is regarded as something 
that is to be determined by the subjective preference of an individual’s will, and each 
person has their own idiosyncratic conception of what the “good life” is.105Individualism 
postulates that a person’s legal relationships with others are first and foremost defined 
by free consent, and posits this on the assumption that consent is, itself, a 
manifestation of individual autonomy. 106 Contract’s analytic framework centers on the 
voluntary assumption of obligations, and the role of contract law is seen to principally 
be the facilitation of voluntary choices by giving them legal effect.107 To fulfil its role, 
therefore, contract law must identify and decline to enforce undertakings that were not 
truly made voluntarily. 108  Non-voluntary positive obligations are regarded with 
suspicion as potentially harmful restrictions on personal liberty.109 
 
Lastly, a conception of contract which, in its substance is individualistic, ordinarily 
associates itself with a conception of contract which is in its form, rules based110 
(formalistic). 111 A rules-based form depicts contract law as a set of determinate rules 
 
99 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
100 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
101 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42.  
102 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640, and Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 41.  
103 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
104 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 41. 
105 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 41. 
106 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
107 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
108 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
109 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
110 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 44, and C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642.  
111 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642. 
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that can be applied in a mechanical way to any situation, and accordingly, there is a 
limited and diminishing role for judicial discretion, and there is a high degree of 
certainty. 112 
 
 The individualism inspired principles of consensualism, pacta 
sunt servanda and freedom of contract 
 
Two cornerstones of the individual philosophy are the doctrines of the freedom of 
contract and the sanctity of contract 113 which two principles became the foundation of 
the South African law of contract. 114 The “freedom of contract” allows an individual 
the freedom to choose whether they wish to contract, with whom and on what terms. 
115 The creation of the contract is the result of free choice, or the exercise of an 
individual autonomy, without any external interference, and during the contracting 
process individuals and their will are sovereign. 116  Ideally, the law ought not to 
prescribe formalities for the conclusion of contracts (as agreement should be sufficient 
to serve as the basis of contract) and, aside from terms that are clearly illegal, the 
parties ought to be able to choose the terms of their contract.117 The sanctity of 
contract (or pacta sunt servanda) requires that once the parties have freely struck their 
bargain, the parties must abide by it. 118 The sanctity of contract has at least two 
aspects. 119 The first is that if the parties are held to their bargains, they must be 
treated as the masters of their own destiny, and courts should not indulge in case by 
case adjustments to the contract on the basis of substantive justice. 120 The second is 
that, if a contract is strictly enforced by one of the parties, courts should not lightly 
relieve the other party from its obligation to perform. 121 Thus, contracts and their terms 
should not be tampered with ex post facto but rather be enforced by the court. 122 Put 
succinctly, “once a court is satisfied that the contract was freely entered into and that 
 
112 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43.  
113 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
114 C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African law (1)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 179 at 185.  
115 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. See too Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 41.  
116 See too Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 41. 
117 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640.  
118 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640.  
119 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
120 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
121 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640. 
122 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 640.  
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its terms are not immoral, illegal or contrary to the public interest, it should uphold and 
if necessary enforce the contract…” 123 As put by Jessel MR, in the now oft-cited 124 
English case of Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson125: “If there is one 
thing which, more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and enforced 
by courts of justice.” 
 
The last important consideration that needs to be had is what the basis for the 
imposition of contractual liability in South Africa is. Despite some early contentions to 
the contrary, 126  the primary basis for contractual liability in South Africa is true 
agreement or consensus ad idem, in accordance with the will theory. 127 Put slightly 
differently, primarily, contractual liability will be found in terms of South African law 
when there is an actual meeting of the minds or subjective agreement. 128 In cases of 
dissensus, however, contractual liability may nevertheless be founded on the doctrine 
of quasi-mutual assent, which is based on the reliance theory. 129  
 
According to the will theory, the basis of contract is to be found in the individuals will, 
and accordingly, the parties are bound to a contract because they have exercised their 
autonomous will and have chosen to be bound. 130 In the will theory, principles of 
individual autonomy are paramount. 131 Proponents of the will theory posit that the will 
theory gives expression to, and protects, the will of the parties, because individual will 
is something that is inherently worthy of respect. 132 The will theory is a reflection of 
 
123 Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 41.  
124 For a comprehensive list of South African cases that have referenced this paragraph see Barnard-Naude op cit 
note 80 at 168, footnote 75.  
125 1875 LR 19 Eq 462.  
126 See Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 37 – 39. For perhaps one of the most comprehensive detailing of South 
Africa’s basis of imposing contractual liability see C-J Pretorius’s collection of articles published in THRHR being 
C-J Pretorius op cit note 114 (for part 1), C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African law (2)’ 
(2004) 67 THRHR 383 (for part 2), and C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African law (3)’ 
(2004) 67 THRHR 549 (for part 3).  
127 Kgopana v Matlala (2019) JOL 46370 (SCA) (“Kgopana”) at para 10.  
128 C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African law (2)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 383 at 383.  
129 Kgopana supra note 127 at para 10. In terms of the reliance theory, the basis of contract is found in the 
detrimental reliance by a person on the appearance of agreement. In simple terms this means contractual liability 
is founded on the reasonable belief of agreement, induced by the conduct of one of the parties. See Dale Hutchison 
op cite note 1 at 36.  
130 Dale Hutchison op cite note 1 at 35.  
131 C-J Pretorius op cit note 81 at 97.  
132 Morris R. Cohen ‘The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46 Harvard Law Review 553 at 575.  
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individualism, and fundamentally, the idea of individual autonomy. 133 The will theory 
posits, in its individualist conception, that contracts are regarded as voluntarily 
assumed obligations, to which the parties thereto have subjectively consented, and, 
that the principle function of contract law is to provide legal sanction to freely assumed 
agreements. 134 As argued by C-J Pretorius, by adopting consensus as the basis for 
contractual liability, the South African courts have manifestly affirmed a commitment 




The rise of individualism in the nineteenth century, and its entailing precepts of 
freedom and sanctity of contract, the will theory and the notion that contractual 
relations ought not to be interfered with on the basis of a substantive standard of 
justice, are by no means without critique, albeit they appear to be taken as 
axiomatic. 136  As poignantly put by Cockrell back in 1992, the privileging of 
individualism and its entailing prescripts in South Africa’s contract law, invariably 
proceeds on the basis that the preference for individualism (and what it entails), is 
taken as an axiomatic truth, rather than a controversial premise in an ongoing 
argument. 137  
 
The “counter-ideology” to individualism is that of collectivism. 138 In collectivism, there 
is an emphasis on collective goods, which goods concern matters of value that are 
common, and are not individualised as either “mine” or “yours”. 139 Collective goods 
are dependent on membership of a community. 140  Collectivism is informed by a 
communitarian view of society, in terms of which there are no free-floating autonomous 
individuals, but rather encumbered persons who are implicated members of the 
community. 141  Communal values are preferred over personal autonomy. 
 
133 C-J Pretorius op cit note 81 at 98.  
134 C-J Pretorius op cit note 81 at 98. 
135 C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African law (3)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 549 at 565.  
136 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 46.  
137 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 46. 
138 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641.  
139 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42.  
140 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
141 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
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142Collectivism proffers that people are social beings, with benefits and burdens that 
come from living in a collective society, and stresses the value of connection 143 
Collectivism emphasises values of reciprocity, solidarity and co-operation, and is 
committed to altruism, in terms of which other people’s interests make a legitimate 
claim on people, and thus one’s positive obligations are not limited to those taken up 
only by free consent.144 Even in the absence of choice, because all individuals are 
joined by communal ties, and not separated by the determinant of consent, individuals 
may be subjected to open-ended obligations, which flow from individuals’ identity and 
relatedness to others. 145 Collectivism, and its close associate, “consumer-
welfarism”146, suggest that in order to provide a reasonable result the judiciary (and 
the legislature) are to provide a set of rules which police people’s bargains. 147 There 
is accordingly less place for free individual choice and market principles. 148 Parties 
who enter into imprudent agreements, may be relieved from liability when justice so 
requires, and paternalistic intervention will be at its strongest when one of the parties 
to the contract is weak or naïve.149  
 
Consumer welfarism can permeate the law in at least two ways.150 Firstly, it can 
promote and deliver specific doctrines, such as estoppel and unconscionability. 151 
Secondly, it can also attempt, in general, to promote the role that reasonableness and 
fairness play in already existing categories of positive law. 152  While consumer-
welfarism encourages judicial activism in ensuring that the outcomes of contractual 
disputes is fair, it hinders consistency, predictability and certainty. 153  
 
Finally, a conception of contract which is in its substance collective, ordinarily 
associates itself with a conception of contract law which is in its form, standards based 
 
142 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
143 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
144 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
145 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 42. 
146 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
147 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
148 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
149 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
150 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
151 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
152 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
153 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642.  
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154(i.e. results orientated). 155 A conception of contract, which is in its form standards 
based, entails the starting point for contract law doctrines taking the form of open-
ended standards. 156 The standards provide highly abstract normative propositions, 
with reference to vague criteria, so to allow for purposive adjudication. 157  The 
permeating idea is that a just legal outcome should be produced, regardless of 
whether such an outcome introduces uncertainty into the law. 158 Justice is done by 
expressing the law in broad standards, which can be individuated through a sensitive 
appreciation of all the relevant facts and considerations on a case-by-case basis. 159  
The role of the judiciary, is therefore, to adjudicate each case before it on the basis of 
what would be best for community. 160  
 
b. Constitutional precepts of contract law, and the regulation of private 
contractual power on the grounds of public policy  
 
On 27 April 1994, the interim Constitution came into effect and on 4 February 1997, 
the Constitution came into effect.  It is beyond the ambit of this submission to detail 
the manner in which both the Interim Constitution and the Constitution affect, and 
ought to affect South Africa’s common law of contract 161 save to merely set out the 
relevant sections of the Constitution and briefly comment thereon.  
 
As a start, section 2 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law 
of South Africa, and law or conduct which is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. Section 8 (1) 
of the Constitution states that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the 
 
154 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 44, and C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642. 
155 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642. 
156 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43.  
157 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43. 
158 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43. 
159 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43. 
160 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43. 
161 This is not the focus of this submission, and such a task would be, with respect, unnecessary. There is in fact 
great debate in this area both in relation to how the Constitution has been held to affect the common law and the 
normative question of how the Constitution ought to affect the common law.  For come views in this regard see A 
Cockrell ‘Private law and the Bill of Rights: A threshold issue of horizontality’ in Y Mokgoro and P Tlakula (eds) Bill 
of Rights Compendium (1998), RH Christie ‘The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights in Y Mokgoro and P Tlakula 
(eds) Bill of Rights Compendium (1998) (updated in 2006), at 3H2 – 3H3, Dale Hutchison op cit note 1 at 50 – 53, 
Alistair Price ‘The Influence of Human Rights on Private Common Law’ (2012) 129 SALJ 330, and more perhaps 
more broadly D Davis and K Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’ (2010) 
26 SAJHR 403.  
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legislature, the executive and the judiciary and all organs of state. Section 8 (2) states 
that a provision in the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person, if and to the 
extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right. Section 8 (3) states that when applying a provision of 
the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of section 8 (2), a court, in order 
to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right, and, may 
develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36 (1) of the Bill of Rights (i.e. the limitation of rights clause). 
Importantly too, in terms of section 8 (4), a juristic person is entitled to the rights in the 
Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that 
juristic person. Section 39 (2) of the Constitution states that when developing the 
common law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court has interpreted section 39 (2) to 
have the effect of requiring courts to be proactive in shaping private law to serve 
constitutional values. 162 Section 39 (2) imposes an obligation on courts to be alive to 
the Constitution’s normative framework, and to ensure that the rules of the common 
law confirm to what the Constitution requires. 163  Of course, the common law of 
contract is replete with “open-ended” concepts such as good faith, public policy and 
reasonableness, which open ended standards provide a ready and convenient means 
of infusing the law of contract with the spirit, purpose and objects of the Constitution.164 
As argued by Price and Hutchison, without doubt, these provisions have laid a 
constitutional foundation for a thorough reassessment of the common law’s regulation 
of private activity (such as exercises of private contractual power) in light of the Bill of 
Rights. 165  
 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning too that section 172 of the Constitution states that when 
deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
 
162 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applies Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 
938 (CC), at para 54.  
163 Dale Hutchison op cit note 1 at 51.  
164 Dale Hutchison op cit note 1 at 51. 
165 Alistair Price and Andrew Hutchison op cit note 3. 
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inconsistency. 166 Therefore, if a court makes a determination that any law or conduct 
is inconsistent with the Constitution, it must declare it invalid, to the extent of the 
inconsistency. Once a court makes such a declaration of invalidity, it may make an 
order that is just and equitable, including an order limiting the retrospective effect of 
the declaration of invalidity, and, an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for 
any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the 
defect. 167 
 
 The Constitutional Court’s first pronouncement  
 
The Constitutional Court was first given the opportunity to deal squarely with 
contractual issues in Barkhuizen v Napier168 (“Barkhuizen”). Barkhuizen dealt with a 
time limitation clause, in terms of which legal proceedings had to be instituted within 
90 days of an insurers repudiation of a claim under the relevant insurance policy, 
failing which the insurer, it was agreed in terms of the contract, would not be liable. 
Barkhuizen instituted legal proceedings after some two years. Barkhuizen contended 
that the time limitation clause was unconstitutional and against public policy because 
it infringed his right to access the Court, which right was enshrined in section 34 of the 
Constitution. Writing for the Majority, Ngcobo J, held that the proper approach to 
constitutional challenges to contractual terms (and their enforcement) is to determine 
whether the disputed term is contrary to public policy, which represents the legal 
convictions of the community, and the values that are held most dear by the society. 
169 Determining public policy, so held Ngcobo J, was no longer fraught with difficulties 
as it is now deeply rooted in the Constitution and the values which underlie it170 and 
what public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must 
be determined by reference to the values that underlie South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy as given expression by the Bill of Rights. A term in a contract that is inimical 
to the values enshrined in the Constitution is contrary to public policy and therefore 
 
166 Section 172 (1)(a). This section is often overlooked in relation to the manner in a court will intervene in private 
contractual relations. This is most likely the case because a contractual term is often seen to be neither law nor 
conduct. See Dale Hutchison op cit note 1 at 52.  
167 Section 172 (1)(b)(i) and (ii).  
168 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).  
169 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at para 28.  
170 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 28.  
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unenforceable.171 Importantly, Ngcobo J appeared to take issue with the High Court’s 
approach to the matter when the matter was before it.172 The High Court tested the 
disputed time limitation clause directly against section 34 of the Bill of Rights. This 
approach, as highlighted by Ngcobo J, raised the question of “horizontality” which 
question has to do with the direct application of the Bill of Rights to private persons as 
contemplated in sections 8(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution. 173 Other than the fact that, 
at that stage at least, the Constitutional Court had not yet considered the issue of the 
direct application of the Bill of Rights to private parties, the High Court’s approach, 
which was premised on a direct application of the Bill of Rights, faced further difficulties 
which were: firstly, the disputed provision, if found to limit a right in the Bill of Rights, 
was not a “law of general application” and therefore could not be subjected to a 
limitation analysis under section 36 (1) of the Constitution174 , and secondly, the 
disputed provision was not “law” or “conduct” in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. 175  These two difficulties (and the manner in which the High Court 
overcame them)176, reasoned Ngcobo J, “cast grave doubt on the appropriateness of 
testing the constitutionality of a contractual term directly against a provision in the Bill 
of Rights.”177 
 
Ngcobo J went on to state that the maxim pacta sunt servanda gives effect to the 
central constitutional values of freedom and dignity, and that self-autonomy or the 
ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence 
of freedom and a vital party of dignity. In relation to the maxim of pacta sunt servanda 
Ngcobo J also stated that it is a universally recognised principle that was profoundly a 
moral principle, on which the coherence of society relies. 178 Ngcobo J held that while 
public policy, which is informed by the Constitution requires, in general, that parties 
should comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily 
 
171 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 29.  
172 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at paras 23 – 26.  
173 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 23.  
174 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 23.  
175 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 25. Section 172(1)(a) states that when deciding a constitutional matter within 
its power, a court must declare any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, invalid to the extent of 
its inconsistency.  
176 The High Court’s reasoning in this regard is not relevant for current purposes but can be gleaned from Ngcobo 
J’s judgement in Barkhuizen at paras 24 – 27.  
177 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 26.  
178 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 87.  
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undertaken (pacta sunt servanda),179public policy also imports the notions of fairness, 
justice and reasonableness, and would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term 
if its enforcement would be unjust or unfair. 180 Ngcobo J then developed a two-stage 
test to determine unfairness.  
 
The first stage entails an objective181 enquiry as to whether the provision was so 
manifestly unreasonable on the face of it that it offended public policy. 182 This enquiry 
is directed at the objective terms of the contract. 183 In this first stage of the inquiry a 
court may consider the relative bargaining powers of the contracting parties. 184 If it is 
found that the objective terms are not inconsistent with public policy on their face, the 
further question will then arise which is whether the terms are contrary to public policy 
in the light of the relative situation of the contracting parties. 185 
 
The second stage, which is more subjective, entails, essentially, an assessment of 
whether, in the specific circumstances of the matter, the enforcement of the clause 
would be contrary to public policy. This second stage would entail the party seeking to 
avoid the enforcement of the clause having to demonstrate why it would be unfair and 
unreasonable in the given circumstances to enforce the clause.186 This may very well 
require an assessment of the reasons why the breaching and/or non-compliant party 
did or purported to do something contrary to the provisions of the contract. 187   
 
On the facts of Barkhuizen, Barkhuizen’s appeal was dismissed as he did not detail 
his reasons for his non-compliance with the time limitation clause, nor did he  lead any 





179 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 57.  
180 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 73.  
181 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59.  
182 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at paras 56, 57 and 59.  
183 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59. 
184 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59. 
185 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59. 
186 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 69.  
187 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 84 – 86.  
188 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 66.  
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 Post Barkhuizen discord  
 
Subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s judgment is Barkhuizen, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd189, rejected the 
appellants’ propositions, which relied on Barkhuizen, that the benchmark for the 
constitutional validity of a term of a contract is fairness, and that even if a contract is 
fair and valid, its enforcement must also be fair in order to survive constitutional 
scrutiny. 190 The Supreme Court of Appeal, per Harms, JA, held that Barkhuizen, had 
to be read in context as it involved a contractual term that purported to limit an 
identified constitutional right (being access to the court). 191 Harms JA held that there 
was nothing in Barkhuizen which purported to hold that the enforcement of a valid 
contractual term must be fair and reasonable even if no public policy consideration 
found in the Constitution or elsewhere was implicated. 192 Harms JA cautioned that 
even when dealing with constitutional values, the principle of legality should not be 
overlooked, and that making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments 
may be destructive of the rule of law. 193 
 
In Botha v Rich194 the Constitutional Court made further important remarks in relation 
to bilateral contracts and introduced a new consideration into the lawful exercise of 
private contractual powers, being proportionality. From the outset Nkabinde J, writing 
unanimously for the Constitutional Court framed the question for determination as 
whether or not the cancellation of the contract was fair and therefor constitutionally 
compliant. 195 In relation to bilateral contracts Nkabinde J held that, bilateral contracts 
are almost invariably cooperative ventures wherein two parties reach a deal involving 
performances by each in order to benefit both. 196  Honouring a bilateral contract, 
therefore, reasoned Nkabinde J, cannot be a matter of each side pursuing their own 
self-interest without regard to the other parties’ interest.197 In relation to whether or not 
 
189 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA).  
190 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) at para 1.  
191 Bredenkamp supra note 190 at para 46 – 47.  
192 Bredenkamp supra note 190 at para 50.  
193 Bredenkamp supra note 190 at para 539.  
194 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC).  
195 Botha v Rich 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) at para 24.  
196 Botha supra note 195 at para 46.  
197 Botha supra note 195 at para 46. 
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to enforce the party’s purported cancellation of the relevant contract, in terms of the 
cancellation clause, Nkabinde J reasoned that granting the cancellation, on the facts 
of the matter, would result in the breaching party suffering a disproportionate penalty 
for the breach, 198 and that the fairness in awarding cancellation is self-evidently linked 
to the consequences of doing so. 199 Criticisms of this judgement aside200 the practical 
effect of the judgment was, as put by Wallis JA (writing extra curially), that there was 
a decision from the Constitutional Court which appeared to hold that when a breaching 
party is faced with the legitimate contractual termination thereof by the innocent party, 
the breaching party may resist cancellation by saying that, notwithstanding the terms 
of the contract, in their particular circumstances, the cancellation is a disproportionate 
response to their breach. 201 
 
In two subsequent High Court matters, Davis J202 and Van Oosten J203, both, on the 
basis of Botha, essentially second-guessed and refused to enforce  the exercise of an 
otherwise lawful private contractual power by a party, on the basis that the prejudice 
and consequences suffered by the other party would be disproportionate, and 
therefore as such would be unfair. Both Davis J and Van Oosten J’s judgments were 
overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 204  The apparent discord therefore 
between the SCA and the Constitutional Court was unhelpful and introduced some 
uncertainty into South Africa’s law of contract. This apparent (or perceived) discord, 
has however, been put to rest by the Constitutional Court, when it eventually handed 
down judgment in the matter that Davis J had given judgment on in the High Court, 




198 Botha supra note 195 at para 51.  
199 Botha supra note 195 at para 51 
200 The judgment ought to have just turned on an application and interpretation of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 
1981. See Dale Hutchison ‘From bona fides to Ubuntu: The quest for fairness in the South African law of contract’ 
(2019) Acta Juridica 99 at 101 at 117 – 120, and M Wallis ‘Commercial Certainty and Constitutionalism: Are they 
Compatible’ (2016) 133 SALJ 545 at 554 – 558.  
201 M Wallis op cit note 200 at 557.  
202 Baedica 213 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust (IT 728/1995) and Others 2018 
(1) SA 549 (WCC).  
203 Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 243 (GJ). Almost inexplicably 
however Van Oosten J’s judgment makes no mention of Botha. Van Oosten J purported to develop the common 
law and the principle of pacta sunt servanda by infusing them with values of ubuntu and fairness.  
204 See Trustees for the time being of Oregon Trust v Beadica 213 CC and Others 2019 (4) SA 517 (SCA), and 
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA).  
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 The Constitutional Court clarifies: Beadica 231 CC and Others v 
Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others 
 
On 17 June 2020, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in the matter of 
Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and 
Others205 (“Beadica”), which is sure to become one of South Africa’s most important, 
if not the most important, judicial pronouncements on South Africa’s law of contract. 
The majority judgment was penned by Theron J, and as recognised by her, “The extent 
to which a court may refuse to enforce valid contractual terms on the basis that it 
considers that enforcement would be unfair, unreasonable or unduly harsh is a burning 
issue in the law of contract in our new constitutional era”. 206 Furthermore, Theron J, 
before getting into the substance of the judgment also recognised that “[t]here is a 
widely held view that there is a growing divergence in the approaches to this issue 
adopted by this Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal.  This perceived divergence 
has contributed to a great deal of undesirable uncertainty in our law of contract.”207 In 
addition to Theron J’s majority judgment208 there was a dissent penned by Froneman 
J209 and a further dissent penned by Victor AJ.  
 
The facts of Beadica were relatively simple. The Second Respondent (“Sales Hire”), 
a close corporation, is an operator and franchisor of Sale’s Hire businesses, which is 
in the business of renting and selling tools and equipment. The Four Applicants (“the 
Applicant CCs”) were all close corporations, whose members were former long-time 
senior employees of Sale’s Hire. The Applicant CCs entered into franchise 
agreements with Sale’s Hire to operate Sale’s Hire business for ten years (“the 
Franchise Agreements”). The Applicant CCs operated their businesses from 
premises leased from the First Respondent (“the Trust”), one of the three trustees of 
the Trust was the sole member of Sale’s Hire. The members of the Applicant CC’s 
acquired their businesses in terms of a black economic empowerment initiative which 
was funded by the Third Respondent, the National Empowerment Fund (“the Fund”). 
 
205 [2020] ZACC 13.  
206 Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others [2020] ZACC 13 
(“Beadica”) at para 1.  
207 Beadica supra note 206 at para 1,  
208 Concurred with by Khampepe ADCJ, Jafta J, Majiedt J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J and Tshiqi J.  
209 Concurred with by Madlanga J.  
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In terms of the franchise agreements entered into between Sale’s Hire and the 
Applicant CCs, the Applicant CCs had to operate their franchised businesses from an 
approved location, which in terms of the franchise agreements were the premises 
leased to the Applicant CCs by the Trust (“the Approved Locations”). Each of the 
leases entered into between the Applicant CCs and the Trust (“the Leases”) were for 
an initial five year period, but provided the Applicant CCs with an option to renew the 
Leases for a further five-year period (“the Option”). The initial five-year period was 
from 1 August 2011 to 31 July 2016. To exercise the Option, the Applicant CCs had 
to notify the Trust in writing at least six months prior to the termination of the initial five-
year period (i.e. on or before 31 January 2016). Three of the Applicant CCs purported 
to exercise the Option in March 2016 and the other Applicant CC seemingly never 
sent through the necessary notice of renewal. In July 2016, the Trust demanded that 
the Applicant CCs vacate the leases premises. The Franchise Agreements gave 
Sale’s Hire an election to terminate the Franchise Agreements in the event that the 
Applicant CCs are ejected from the Approved Locations or if the lease agreements in 
respect of the Approved Locations are terminated.  It was common cause that if Sale’s 
Hire terminated the franchise agreements the Applicant CCs businesses would 
collapse. However, it appeared to be within Sale’s Hire’s discretion to allow the 
Applicant CCs to continue operating their businesses at other approved premises. The 
(only) reason advanced by the Applicant CCs for their failure to exercise the Option in 
accordance with its terms was that they were not sophisticated business people and 
were not fully apprised of their rights and obligations regarding the Options. 210 Put 
slightly differently, the Applicants explained they were unsophisticated and not versed 
in the niceties of the law. 211 The Applicant CCs brought an urgent application in the 
High Court seeking an order declaring that the renewal options had been validly 
exercised and prohibiting the Trust from taking steps to evict them. The Trust brought 
a counter-application for the Applicant CCs evictions from the Approved Locations.  
 
As alluded to earlier, the High Court found in favour of the Applicant CCs, declared 
the Leases validly renewed and dismissed the Trust’s counter-application. The High 
Court relied on Botha which it understood as introducing a principle of proportionality 
 
210 As put by Theron J at Beadica supra note 206 at para 93.  
211 As put by Froneman J at Beadica supra note 206 at para 196. 
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into the law of contract, which was that the sanction of cancellation for breach must 
be proportionate to the consequences of the breach. 212 The High Court found that the 
termination of the Leases would result in the termination of the Franchise Agreements, 
the collapse of the Applicant CCs’ businesses and the failure of the black economic 
empowerment initiatives. These consequences, held the High Court, would constitute 
a disproportionate sanction for the failure by the Applicant CCs to comply with the strict 
terms of the Option.213 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal stressed the importance of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda and the need for certainty in contract, and held that the notion ostensibly 
derived from Botha, that a disproportionate sanction for breach of a contract, or for a 
failure to comply with the terms of a contract, is unenforceable, which was relied on 
by the High Court was not a part of South Africa’s law of contract and its recognition 
would undermine the principle of legality. 214 While the Supreme Court of Appeal 
recognised that a Court may decline to enforce contractual terms which are, or the 
enforcement of which would be, contrary to public policy, it held that such a power 
should be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases. 215 
 
The majority began their judgment by determining whether or not leave to appeal 
should be granted. In make that determination, the majority acknowledged that the 
apparent divergence between the approaches of the Constitutional Court and the SCA 
had been recognised as problematic and undesirable, and that the matter before them 
presented an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to provide much needed clarity 
on the issues around the judicial control of contracts. 216  Still while considering 
whether or not leave to appeal ought to be granted the majority recognised that “[t]he 
questions about the judicial enforcement of contracts that arise in this case are of 
general public importance, as contractual relations are at the bedrock of economic 
life.”217 Once determining that it would be in the interests of justice to grant leave to 
appeal, the majority went on to provide a substantial history of the judicial enforcement 
 
212 Beadica supra note 206 at para 196. 
213 Beadica supra note 206 at para 11.  
214 Beadica supra note 206 at para 12.  
215 Beadica supra note 206 at para 12.  
216 Beadica supra note 206 at para 17 – 18.   
217 Beadica supra note 206 at para 19.  
35 
 
of contracts. 218 Save to set out how the majority interpreted Botha, it is not necessary 
for current purposes to detail the majority’s tracking of the history of the judicial 
enforcement of contracts in its entirety. It is necessary to briefly outline how the 
majority interpreted Botha as that judgment has (most likely) been the judgment which 
has imbued South Africa’s law of contract with the most amount of uncertainty, with its 
apparent introduction of a principle of “disproportionality.” The majority held that Botha 
categorically did no revise or revisit the Barkhuizen test, and that Barkhuizen remains 
the leading authority in South Africa’s law of contract on the role of equity in contract, 
as a part of public policy considerations. 219  The majority further held that the 
“assumption” that Botha is authority for the general proposition in South Africa’s law 
of contract that a party who breaches its contractual obligations can avoid the 
termination of a contract by claiming that termination would be disproportionate or 
unfair in the circumstances, was based on a misreading of the ratio in Botha and rests 
on a misconception of what Botha was about. 220Botha, reasoned the majority, must 
be understood within the “relevant statutory scheme in issue”: it concerned the 
question of whether a seller’s contractual right to cancel for breach could be enforced 
within the statutory scheme created by section 27(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 
of 1981.221  
 
Once the majority had clarified what was held in Botha and confirmed that the test 
outlined in Barkhuizen was still the means through which contractual provisions and 
their enforcement could be judicially second-guessed, the majority went on to clarify 
certain propositions in South Africa’s common law of contract. The majority stated that 
a court may not refuse to enforce contractual terms on the basis that the enforcement 
would, in its subjective view, be unfair, unreasonable or unduly harsh,222 and it is only 
where a contractual term or its enforcement is so unfair, unreasonable or unjust that it 
is contrary to public policy that a court may refuse to enforce it. 223 The enforcement 
 
218 See Beadica supra note 206 at paras 20 - 60.  
219 Beadica supra note 206 at para 58.  
220 Beadica supra note 206 at para 59.  
221 Beadica supra note 206 at para 59. 
222 Beadica supra note 206 at para 80.  
223 Beadica supra note 206 at para 80.  
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of contractual provisions cannot be dependent on the idiosyncratic inferences of a few 
judicial minds. 224 
 
The majority held that pacta sunt servanda is not a relic of South Africa’s pre-
constitutional common law, and it plays a crucial role in the judicial control of contracts 
through the instrument of public policy, as it gives expression to constitutional 
values,225 gives persons motivation for social coordination and is crucial to economic 
development, 226 and if it is to be denuded by the courts, South Africa’s constitutional 
project will be imperilled.227 Nevertheless, the “pre-constitutional” privileging of pacta 
sunt servanda is not appropriate under a constitutional approach to judicial control or 
enforcement of contracts.”228 In South Africa’s constitutional era, held the majority, 
pacts sunt servanda is not the only, nor the most important principle informing judicial 
control of contracts and there is no basis for “privileging” it over other constitutional 
rights and values. 229  The majority went on to hold that “[w]here a number of 
constitutional rights and values are implicated, a careful balancing exercise is required 
to determine whether the enforcement of the contractual terms would be contrary to 
public policy.” 230 
 
In relation to the proposition of “perceptive restraint” (mainly espoused by the SCA) – 
according to which a court must only use its power to invalidate or not enforce a 
contract, sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases 231 – the majority held that, albeit 
the Constitutional Court has already recognised that a Court ought to exercise its 
power to second-guess a contract’s terms or enforcement only in worthy cases, Courts 
should not shrink from their constitutional duty to infuse public policy with constitutional 
values. Furthermore, the notion of “perceptive restraint” should not be used “blithely” 
as a protective shield for contracts that undermine the very goals that the Constitution 
is designed to achieve. 232  The majority held that the degree of restraint to be 
 
224 Beadica supra note 206 at para 81.  
225 Beadica supra note 206 at para 83.  
226 Beadica supra note 206 at para 84.  
227 Beadica supra note 206 at para 85.  
228 Beadica supra note 206 at para 86.  
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231 See A B and Another v Pridwin Preparatory School and Others (2019) All SA 1 (SCA) at para 27.  
232 Beadica supra note 206 at para 90.  
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exercised must be balanced against the backdrop of constitutional rights and 
values.233 
 
On the facts, the majority held that “while the explanation provided [i.e. the explanation 
why there was non-compliance with the Option by the Applicants] is not the only 
relevant consideration, it is critical in the overall assessment of whether the 
enforcement would be contrary to public policy in all the particular circumstances of a 
case.” 234 As stated earlier, the only explanation given by the Applicants for why they 
did not comply with the terms of the Option was that “they were not sophisticated 
business people and not fully apprised of their rights and obligations regarding their 
options to renew the leases.”235 This explanation was not considered sufficient by the 
majority who held that the harsh outcome alone, without an explanation for the failure 
to comply, cannot constitute a sufficient basis to hold that the enforcement of the terms 
of Leases would be contrary to public policy. 236 Accordingly, the majority dismissed 
the Applicant’s appeal with costs.  
 
Although the judgment in Beadica appears to finally bring clarity around the issues 
relating to the judicial second-guessing of the enforcement of contractual provisions 
on public policy grounds, a final matter to be briefly considered is that of AB and 
Another v Pridwin Preparatory School and Others237 (“Pridwin”), which judgment was 
also handed down by the Constitutional Court on 17 June 2020. Essentially, what was 
in dispute in Pridwin was whether or not the First Respondent, an independent school, 
could terminate the contract entered into between itself and the parents of two of its 
Learners, due to the parents alleged misconduct, without a pre-termination hearing. 
The majority, also per Theron J, stated that “[t]he central question to be considered is 
whether it is constitutionally permissible for an independent school to expel children 
due to their parents’ alleged misconduct, without following a fair procedure and without 
appropriate justification for its decision.”238  Although the majority in the Supreme 
 
233 Beadica supra note 206 at para 90. 
234 Beadica supra note 206 at para 92.  
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Court of Appeal239, and at least the dissent penned by Nicholls AJ in the Constitutional 
Court240 consider the matter mainly through the prism of contract, the majority in the 
Constitutional Court dispenses with the matter on the basis of the direct applicability 
of sections 28 and 29 of the Bill of Rights to the matter. Accordingly, despite Pridwin 
admittedly appearing on the face of it to be a contractual matter, for current purposes 
at least, the majority’s judgment does not affect the position in Beadica outlined above. 
However, what is apparent from all four of the judgments penned in Pridwin, and the 
dissenting judgment penned by Froneman J in Beadica, the Courts, where the context 
requires, will not hesitate to directly apply, one way or another, provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to private parties and their interactions. This issue although important, however, 
is beyond the remit of this contribution.   
  
 
239 AB and Another v Pridwin Preparatory School and Others 2019 (1) SA 327 (SCA) 
240 See Pridwin at paras 1 – 96.  
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V. CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT 
STANDARDS  
 
 Rationality versus Public Policy  
 
I will now endeavour to compare the different standards that a Court will on the one 
hand, hold the exercise of private contractual power to on the basis of public policy, 
and, on the other hand, the applicable standards for the exercise of public power on 
the basis of rationality.  
 
 The “substance” of the two standards compared   
 
As has been highlighted above, a Court will second-guess the exercise of public power 
against the yardstick of, inter alia, rationality.  Fundamentally, rationality is a question 
of means and ends: is the exercise of public power rationality linked to the legitimate 
government purpose for which the power was exercised241  or conferred? For an 
exercise of public power to be rational it does not have to be either fair or reasonable, 
and neither does it have to be the most correct or best means which the relevant 
exerciser of public power could have deployed to achieve the legitimate government 
purpose sought to be achieved. The exercise of public power merely needs to fall 
within a very broad spectrum of constitutionally permissible rational means of attaining 
the legitimate government purpose. Although rationality is determined objectively, a 
Court that is called upon to second-guess an exercise of public power on grounds of 
rationality may be required to undertake some (although limited) speculation as to 
whether the exercise of public power will, either symbolically, or as a matter of 
empirical causality, have the necessary connection/relationship with the determined 
purpose to be held to be rational. Moreover, the threshold of rationality does not have 
as a facet any of the substantive and open-ended requirements that are facets of 
public policy, such as fairness, reasonableness and justness. When determining 
whether or not any exercise of public power is rational, there need not be 
 
241  Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
(21688/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 246 (26 June 2020) at para 19.  
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considerations of fairness, reasonableness and/or justness. Determining rationality is 
a rules based and mechanical endeavour in its nature: can (objectively) the means 
chosen achieve the ends sought to be achieved? If yes, then the exercise of public 
power passes the rationality threshold. The process followed in making such a 
decision must only be rational, and the decision maker need not hear representations 
of the persons affected by their decision. 
 
When a person exercises private contractual power, the threshold which that exercise 
of private contractual power must overcome to be lawful, on public policy grounds, is 
not so straight forward. However, at a minimum, for the exercise of a private 
contractual power to be lawful (and not fall foul of public policy, through the prism of 
the test outlined in Barkhuizen as stated in Beadica) it cannot be so unfair, unjust or 
unreasonable so as to be contrary to public policy, and where a number of 
Constitutional rights are implicated, a careful analysis will need to be undertaken. This, 
as has been admitted by the Constitutional Court, is a “hard call”242. The “careful 
balancing exercise”243 that is required when it comes to determining whether a Court 
ought to interfere with private contractual relations on public policy grounds is a value 
laden undertaking which will rarely have a predictable, easy and certain outcome. 244 
When determining whether or not the enforcement of a contractual provision is against 
public policy, a Court will be forced to adjudicate based on open-ended standards, as 
opposed to hard and fast rules. As outlined above, such standards based adjudication 
is usually associated with a conception of contract which is underpinned by 
collectivism, 245 and introduces a level of uncertainty, in that a just outcome is sought 
to be produced on a sensitive appreciation of all the facts and relevant policies on a 
case by case basis.246 Indeed, this is what makes this endeavour a “hard call”. A Court 
that is called upon to second-guess an exercise of private contractual power, on public 
policy grounds, is required to make a determination of the fairness, justness or 
reasonableness of such exercise, on the specific facts of the matter. In making such 
 
242 Beadica supra note 206 at para 109.  
243 Beadica supra note 206 at para 109. 
244 By way of example, in Beadica, collectively through the High Court, the SCA and the Constitutional Court, 12 
judges ruled that the strict terms of the Option be enforced and 4 ruled that the strict terms of the Option ought not 
to be enforced. This is not a forgone conclusion  
245 See above Chapter IV, a, iii. 
246 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 43. 
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a determination, the Court will be required to, on the facts, make a finding as to 
whether or not, in the specific circumstances, the enforcement of the contractual 
provision is unfair, unjust, or unreasonable, and if so, whether the enforcement of the 
contractual provision is sufficiently unfair, unjust or unreasonable so as to be contrary 
to public policy. Such a determination is necessarily highly facts dependant and value 
laden.  
 
The difference between what rationality (in the context of the exercise of public power) 
and public policy (in the context of the exercise of private power) requires is best 
illustrated when viewed through the eyes of the power wielder. Such an illustration can 
be done with regard to the two fictitious scenarios outlined in Chapter 1.  In Scenario 
1247 prior to Y determining whether or not to enforce the strict terms of the relevant 
clause, Y would need to consider whether the strict enforcement of the clause would, 
in X’s particular circumstances, be so unfair, unjust or unreasonable so as to be 
contrary to public policy. Assuming a number of Constitutional rights and values are 
implicated (which would, most likely, always be the case), Y, as a private person, 
would need to undertake the careful balancing act in determining whether or not the 
strict enforcement of the contractual provision may be contrary to public policy. Y will 
be called upon to make difficult value judgements, in circumstances where there are, 
in effect, endless considerations that may need to take into account of X’s possible 
situation and, how, in X’s specific situation, Y’s enforcement of the clause may in some 
way be unfair, unreasonable or unjust in relation to X. In Scenario 2,248 however, the 
relevant Minister, to be assured of her decision’s lawfulness, would only need to 
ensure that her decision had a relationship or connection with whatever purpose she 
was seeking to achieve in exercising her power. There would be no requirement for 
the Minister to determine whether or not the effect of her decision would be fair, 
reasonable or just, in the particular circumstances of those persons who are to be 
affected by the Minister’s decision.  
 
 
247 Which was, for ease of reference, a contractual provision which provides: “X shall have the right to extend the 
Lease period by a further period as set out in clause 10 below, provided X gives Y written notice of its exercising 
of the option at least 6 months prior to the termination date.” 
248 Which was, for ease of reference, a Minister’s decision to promulgate regulations to the effect that: “The sale, 
distribution and transportation of any tobacco products and any alcoholic beverage is prohibited during the National 
State of Disaster which was declared by the President on 1 June 2020.” 
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I submit, therefore, that the threshold against which a Court will second-guess the 
exercise of private contractual power, on public policy grounds, is a higher than the 
threshold of rationality against which a Court will second-guess the exercise of public 
power. Put slightly differently, Courts are entitled to hold the exercise of private 
contractual power on public policy grounds, to higher standards than Courts are 
entitled to hold the exercise of public power to on rationality grounds. This is illustrated 
by the fact that a rational exercise of public power will be lawful despite it being unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust, whereas an exercise of private contractual power will be 
unlawful if it is “rational” (i.e. exercised for the purpose that the power was conferred), 
but unfair, unreasonable and unjust, and so much so that it offends public policy. Of 
course, much of the determination as to which threshold requires a higher standard of 
conduct comes down to the “so much so” phrase of the preceding sentence. However, 
that “so much so” aspect is the very subjective aspect of the standard set by the public 
policy threshold making the exercise of private contractual power less certain and thus 
allowing Courts a broader discretion to intervene in private contractual relations. This 
too, it is submitted, supports the proposition that Courts are entitled to hold the 
exercise of a private power (on public policy grounds) to a significantly higher standard 
that the exercise of a public power (on rationality grounds).  
 
By means of an illustrative example, consider the facts of, and the Constitutional 
Court’s approach in the case of Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and 
Others 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC) (“Motau”).  The basic facts of Motau were that the Minister 
took a decision to remove two directors from the board of the Armaments Corporation 
of South Africa (SOC) Ltd (“Armscor”). Armscor’s governing statute, the Armaments 
Corporation of South Africa Ltd Act 51 of 2003 (“the Armscor Act”), permitted the 
Minister to remove members of Armscor’s board on good cause. The two board 
members challenged the Minister’s decision to remove them from the Armscor board 
on inter alia the basis that the Minister’s decision was irrational.249 Khampepe J, in 
dismissing the two directors rationality challenge, held that the Minister’s decision was 
rationally related to the purpose for which the Minister’s power to terminate was 
conferred, namely executive oversight of the Armscor board. 250  Khampepe J further 
 
249 Motau supra note 65 at para 69 – 71.  
250 Motau supra note 65 at para 69 – 71. 
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held that there was a rational link between the Minister’s decision to terminate the two 
board members and the need to address Armscor’s failures. 251  Khampepe J 
reiterated that the Constitutional Court was not tasked to determine whether the 
Minister could have made a better or different decision. 252 Whatever the effect that 
the two board members’ termination was going to have on them was an irrelevant 
consideration, as was whether or not the Minister’s decision was fair, reasonable 
and/or just. If such a factual scenario played out in the sphere of private contractual 
relations, for the exercise of the equivalent private contractual power to be lawful, the 
effect of it, or the consequence of it, would both be relevant and determinative. The 
Minister would , by way of example, have to consider what the effect of being removed 
from the board of Armscor had on the two board members. 253 If the effect or 
consequence of the exercise of the private contractual power was so unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust vis-à-vis the two removed members, their removal would be 
unlawful. The exerciser of private contractual power stands to be second-guessed by 
a Court against a higher threshold than that of the Minister in Motau.  
 
 Relevant procedural considerations to bear in mind considering 
the higher standard of public policy  
 
In addition to the above detailed substantive differences, in terms of procedure, it is 
important to consider that when a Court comes to second-guess or review the exercise 
of a public power, often times,254 through Rule 53 (“Rule 53”) of the Uniform Rules of 
Court (“the Rules”), it will have the benefit of being in a position to consider both the 
record of the proceedings sought to be reviewed (i.e. the record of the decision 
constituting all of the material that was before the decision maker relevant to them 
making the decision) and the reasons furnished by the decision maker for the decision. 
As stated by Maya DP (as she then was), Rule 53, by facilitating access to the record 
of the proceedings under review, enables the Courts to perform their inherent review 
 
251 Motau supra note 65 at para 71.  
252 Motau supra note 65 at para 70.  
253 Of course, the two board members could have raised any grounds to plead why the effect of their removal was 
unfair. They could have argued that they support their families, that they would have their reputations ruined, that 
projects they were overseeing in the public interest would be thwarted if they were removed.  
254 If, in fact, not all the time. See: Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of SA; In re Democratic Alliance 
v President of the Republic of SA and others [2017] 3 All SA 124 (GP) (“DA v President”).  
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function to scrutinise the exercise of public power for compliance with constitutional 
precepts. 255 As further held by the Constitutional Court, a record delivered pursuant 
to Rule 53 is an invaluable tool in the review process and helps the Court in the 
performance of its reviewing function. 256 The delivery of the record, pursuant to Rule 
53, ensures both that the Court has the relevant information before it and that there is 
equality of arms between persons challenging a decision and the decision-maker. 257 
This equality of arms requires that parties to the review proceedings must each have 
a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case under conditions that do not place it at 
a substantial disadvantage in relation to their opponents. 258  The effect of this, 
essentially, is that all parties have identical copies of the relevant documents before 
them on which to draft their affidavits. 259  Additionally, the further procedural 
mechanisms that are outlined in Rule 53, such as the Applicant’s (i.e. the reviewing 
party’s) right to amend its original notice of motion and supplement its founding 
affidavit upon receipt of the record and the decision maker’s reasons, are useful  
procedural tools open to litigants to utilise which enable the Court to properly perform 
its reviewing function. As stated by Vally J, Courts have for the last five decades been 
able to perform their judicial functions because of the provisions of Rule 53. 260  The 
important consideration to be taken into account is that Rule 53 sets up a nuanced 
and purpose-conscious procedure and mechanism through which reviews of 
exercises of public power can be properly and fully prosecuted by the Applicant and 
adjudicated by the Court.  
 
The only marginally comparable procedural devices in matters wherein the exercise 
of private contractual power is to be second-guessed are those contained in Rule 35 
of the Rules (being the rules relating to discovery). The effect of this is that when a 
Court is called upon to make the hard call on whether or not the exercise of a private 
contractual power is contrary to public policy or not, the Court will be called upon to 
make such a determination without the benefit of any specifically designed mechanism 
 
255 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commissioner 2017 (1) SA 367 (SCA) at para 13.  
256 Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality 2014 (6) SA 592 (CC) at para 37.  
257 Erasmus Superior Court Practice, RS 11, 2019, D1-710.  
258 Erasmus Superior Court Practice, RS 11, 2019, D1-710. 
259 Erasmus Superior Court Practice, RS 11, 2019, D1-710, and Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes 1993 (1) SA 
649 (A).  
260DA v President supra note 254 at para 21.  
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comparable to Rule 53 and the benefits such a mechanism may import into the 
adjudicative process.  
 
The consequence of there being no comparable provision to Rule 53, in instances 
where the exercise of private contractual power is concerned, is borne out in Beadica. 
In Beadica, the various Courts had to make the admittedly difficult decision as to 
whether or not the failure of a black economic empowerment initiative was sufficiently 
harsh enough a consequence for the Court to interfere in the parties’ contractual 
relationship. In making this determination, the Courts had to assess the reasons 
advanced by the Applicant CCs for why they failed to comply with the strict terms of 
the Option. 261 The only reason advanced by the Applicant CCs was that they were 
not sophisticated business people and were not fully apprised of their rights and 
obligations regarding the Options.262 This reason was accepted in the High Court and 
in two dissenting judgments in the Constitutional Court, while it was rejected by the 
SCA and the majority judgment penned by Theron J in the Constitutional Court. 
Differing judgments on the reason advanced aside, what is common between all of 
the judgments is that they only had the ipse dixit of the members of the Applicant CCs 
to base their conclusions on. This was the case where what had to be determined was 
whether or not, in the circumstances, the enforcement of the Option would be against 
public policy. Such a standards-based and value-laden determination, centred on 
abstract precepts, would, to be properly undertaken, have to entail an assessment of 
essentially an infinite number of possibly relevant facts, most of which will likely not be 
before the Court making the determination. 263 The result of this is that the Court 
makes a decision not on what is factually the case, as it would do when it has before 
it the benefit of the record received in terms of the provisions of Rule 53, but on what 
is put before it by the parties. In both Barkhuizen and Beadica the Constitutional Court 
did not rule that, in the circumstances, the enforcement of the relevant contractual 
provision was not against public policy. Rather, the Constitutional Court in both cases 
ruled that, on what was placed before it by the party alleging that the strict enforcement 
was contrary to public policy, it could not rule that the enforcement was against public 
 
261 Beadica supra note 206 at para 93.  
262 Beadica supra note 206 at para 93. 
263 This indeed was one of the issues in Barkhuizen and Beadica.  
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policy. A slight, but important distinction. Accordingly, it may very well have been that 
on all the facts and objectively assessed, the strict enforcement of the relevant 
provisions was contrary to public policy. However, the Court was not in a position, 
because of what was (not) before it, to make such a determination. 
 
A second more practical or procedural consideration relates to what information is 
before the exerciser of either a public or private power, and with how much certainty 
they can rely on the eventual enforcement of their exercise of power by the Court. This 
consideration is also best illustrated with use of the two fictitious scenarios outlined in 
Chapter 1. In Scenario 1, before Y considers enforcing the strict terms of the option, 
and holding X to the six month notice period, Y will need to consider whether or not, 
in X’s circumstances, it’s (Y’s) exercise of its private contractual power would be so 
unfair, unjust or unreasonable so as to be against public policy, and whether or not, 
and to what extent, any of X’s rights in the Bill of Rights may be implicated. Y would 
only be able to undertake such a consideration if it was fully abreast of all the 
potentially relevant facts in relation to X’s circumstances, which, it is submitted Y would 
never (and in fact could never) reasonably be in possession of. Furthermore, even if 
Y was in possession of all relevant facts to make the determination, that determination, 
as continuously stressed by the Constitutional Court, is a difficult and value laden 
determination. Y would, essentially, be required to enforce its contractual powers and 
then wait and see what X came up with at the stage of litigation. Accordingly, Y will 
not be able to predict, with great certainty, whether or not a Court may second-guess 
the exercise of its private contractual power. While it has always been the case that 
parties to a contract cannot, with complete certainty, predict the manner in which a 
Court may adjudicate on any position adopted by those parties vis-à-vis the contract, 
the uniqueness of the public policy threshold is that it necessarily entails a value laden 
and abstract standards based assessment of both of the parties particular 
circumstances outside the ambit of the terms of the contract. Accordingly, there is 
there is more unpredictability and uncertainty than there would ordinarily be when a 
party litigates on most (if not all) other contractual principles.   
 
On the other hand, in Scenario 2, before taking the decision and exercising her public 
power, to be sure that a Court will not second-guess her, the Minister would merely 
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need to be assured that on her own reasons, and on the information that is before her, 
her exercise of power will attain the power’s determined purpose either symbolically 
or intrinsically. Put slightly differently, the Minister will only need to be assured that her 
decision, and her exercise of public power, is rationally related to the determined 
legitimate government purpose. The Minister will not need to consider the effect that 
her decision will have on any specific person, let alone consider whether or not those 
effects, in that specific person’s circumstances, would be so unfair, unjust or 
unreasonable so as to be contrary to public policy. Moreover, all the information that 
the Minister would have to possibly consider, to assure herself that her decision will 
find protection from the Courts, would be before her, and indeed constructed by her.  
 
 Is the higher standard private power is held to justified? 
 
As has now been demonstrated, the public policy threshold that a Court will second-
guess the exercise of a private contractual power against is significantly higher than 
the rationality threshold that a Court will second-guess the exercise of a public power 
against. Furthermore, as has also been demonstrated above, it needs to be noted that 
there are numerous procedural tools that a Court will have at its disposal when 
reviewing the exercise of a public power, which tools (or similar tools) a Court will not 
have when reviewing the exercise of a private contractual power. What needs to be 
considered now is whether or not such differing levels of threshold are justifiable.  
 
 Entitled vs Willing to intervene  
 
In Chapter I the proposition was put that Courts, traditionally at least, would not really 
be entitled to second-guess the manner in which Y exercised its private contractual 
power in Scenario 1, but would only be entitled to second-guess the manner in which 
the Minister exercised her public power in Scenario 2.  I submitted that this proposition 
rang true.  However, bearing in mind what is set out above, this proposition is untrue 
at least when it comes to the thresholds of rationality and public policy. The more 
correct and more nuanced proposition is that: Courts are entitled to second-guess the 
exercise of private contractual power against the threshold hold of public policy on 
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significantly wider grounds than Courts are entitled to second-guess the exercise of 
public power against the threshold of rationality.  
 
This broader entitlement, however, does not necessarily mean that a Court may be 
more willing to intervene in private contractual relations than it is to intervene in the 
way public power is exercised. Indeed, the rationale and constitutional imperative that 
exercises of public power stand to be overturned by the Court is set out at length 
above. For a Court to intervene in either the exercise of public or private power, it must 
both be entitled and willing to do so. It is this notion of willingness that will be examined 
further below.  
 
 Deference  
 
A Court’s willingness (or lack thereof) to interfere in the exercise of a public power 
versus a Court’s willingness to interfere in private contractual relations can be best 
assessed through the prism of “deference.” What follows below is an examination of 
how “deferent” a Court will be (i.e. willing or unwilling) to intervene in both the exercise 
of a public and private power.  
 
1. Deference in public law 
 
The notion of “deference” is no stranger to public law. Outlining the differing 
conceptions, understandings, and entailments of the notion of deference is well 
beyond the scope of this submission.264  However, what the notion of deference 
essentially entails is that Courts are to treat decision makers (i.e. those who are 
exercising public powers), or the least the decisions that they come to, with the 
appropriate amount of deference or respect. 265 In 2000 Hoexter set out what she 
believed to be the sort of deference South Africa ought to strive toward. 266 Hoexter, 
 
264 For a contribution which does exactly this, see PJH Maree and G Quinot ‘A Decade and a Half of Deference’ 
(2016) TSAR 268.  
265 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 
(“Bato Star”) at para 46.  
266 See Cora Hoexter ‘The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law’ (2000) 117 SALJ 484.  
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submitted that that type of judicial deference South Africa should strive toward, should 
be as follows: 
 
“we [South Africa] should be aspiring to consists of a judicial willingness to 
appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-
laden or polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact and law due 
respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued by 
administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which 
they operate. This type of deference is perfectly consistent with a concern for 
individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It 
ought to be shaped not by an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, 
but by a careful weighing up of the need for and the consequences of judicial 
intervention. Above all, it ought to be shaped by a conscious determination not 
to usurp the functions of administrative agencies; not to cross over from review 
to appeal.” 267 
 
Hoexter’s passage above has been quoted with approval by the Constitutional 
Court.268In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and Others269 O’Regan J held that the need for Courts to show deference flows from 
the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers.270  O’Regan J 
went on to state that in showing deference to the decisions of exercisers of public 
powers, a Court is recognising and respecting the proper role of the executive within 
the Constitution.271  Price outlines two concise reasons which explain and justify the 
Court’s duty of respect (i.e. deference) towards an exerciser of public power’s 
judgment. 272  The first is that of democratic principle and the second is that of 
institutional competence. 273  In relation to democratic principle, decisions of the 
 
267 Cora Hoexter op cit note 266 at 501 – 502.  
268 Bato Star supra note 265.  
269 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC).  
270 At para 46. For a consideration of the issues with O’Regan J’s finding in this regard see PJH Maree and G 
Quinot op cit note 264 in general, but specifically from page 452.  
271 Bato Star supra note 265 at para 48.  
272 See Alistair Price ‘Rationality Review of Legislation and Executive Decisions: Poverty Alleviation Network and 
Albutt’ (2010) 127 SALJ 580.  
273 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588.  
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legislative and executive branches of the state deserve respect as they are “clothed 
with democratic legitimacy”. 274 The legislative branches of the state are directly, and 
the executive branches of state are indirectly, accountable to the electorate. 275 
Furthermore, evaluative and empirical judgments on contested (and indeed value-
laden) political questions by democratically accountable decision-makers ought not to 
be lightly second-guessed by the Courts. 276   
 
In relation to institutional competence, Courts are ill-suited compared to the other 
branches of the state to make decisions, as judges lack the experience, expertise and 
resources to make certain kinds of policy decisions. 277 Indeed, this is the sentiment 
expressed by Hoexter in her above seminal passage.  
 
Another important facet of deference is its variability or context specific applicability. 
Depending on the context and the circumstances, a Court ought to subject the 
exercise of a public power to varying degrees of scrutiny, or to put it differently, will 
show varying levels of deference to the public power exerciser. 278 Hoexter postulated 
that the intensity of a Court's scrutiny and its willingness to intervene in a particular 
case will depend on factors such as: the policy content of the decision, the breadth of 
the discretion and the degree of expertise of the decision-maker, the impact of the 
decision, the degree of public participation in the decision-making process and the 
presence or absence of an opportunity for internal reconsideration. 279  Price 
demonstrates that legislative decisions deserve a high level of “respect” from the 
Courts because of South Africa’s representative and participatory law-making 
process, whereas decisions of the executive deserve less respect, because they are 
generally made without the same degree of public participation (if any) as legislative 
decisions and executive members are only indirectly accountable to the electorate.280 
Even in the context of second-guessing exercises of public power against the 
 
274 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588. 
275 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588. 
276 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588. 
277 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588. 
278 Cora Hoexter op cit note 266 at 503.  
279 Cora Hoexter op cit note 266 at 503. 
280 Alistair Price op cit note 272 at 588. 
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(objective and low) threshold of rationality, that Courts will exercise varying degrees 
of deference seems now to be clear. 281 
 
2. “Deference” in private law 
 
Whereas in public law the Court’s deference is explained and justified on the basis of 
democratic principles and institutional competence, in the context of contract law, a 
Court’s deference (or restraint) is explained and justified mainly on the basis of certain 
individualistic precepts that underpin the law of contract. The Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen expressed how allowing parties the freedom of contract and the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda are expressions of self-autonomy and are the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity.282 Furthermore, as held by the majority in Beadica, 
it is a requirement of public policy that contracts that are freely and voluntary entered 
into must be honoured. 283  Interestingly, in Beadica, the Constitutional Court 
recognised the important roles that the certainty of contract, and the assurance that 
lawful contracts will be enforced, play in South Africa’s economic development, which 
development fosters a fertile environment for the advancement of constitutional 
rights.284  
 
Albeit the majority in Baedica shied away from endorsing the principle of “perceptive 
restraint” that was elucidated by the SCA, the majority in Beadica made explicit that 
Courts should only use their power to interfere in private contractual relationships in 
worthy cases.285 The majority also held that although the pre-constitutional privileging 
on pacta sunt servanda is not appropriate under a constitutional approach to judicial 
control of enforcement of contacts, the principle is still crucially important to South 
Africa’s constitutional project. 286 Nevertheless, at the same time, the majority made it 
clear that Courts must not shrink from their constitutional duty to infuse public policy 
with constitutional values. 287 A careful balancing act will be required, and the restraint 
 
281 See Alistair Price op cit note 272.  
282 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 28. 
283 Beadica supra note 206 at para 83.  
284 Beadica supra note 206 at para 83.  
285 Beadica supra note 206 at para 89 – 90.  
286 Beadica supra note 206 at para 86 – 87. 
287 Beadica supra note 206 at para 86 – 87. 
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to be exercised by a Court must be balanced against the backdrop of South Africa’s 
constitutional rights and values. 288 However, it should also be recalled that section 
172 of the Constitution which states that when deciding a constitutional matter within 
its power, a Court must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 289   
 
It appears that there are at least two factors which will have an effect on the level of 
scrutiny to which a Court will subject the exerciser of a private contractual power.  The 
first is the relative bargaining powers of the parties to the contract.290 Indeed, the 
presumed equality of bargaining power has always been one of the reasons Courts 
have traditionally been unwilling to intervene in private contractual relations and a 
presumed inequality of power positions in between individuals and the state has 
historically always been one of the main (if not the main) reasons Courts have been 
willing to interfere in the exercise of public power. 291 The starker the inequality of the 
parties’ bargaining positions, the higher the level of scrutiny to which the Courts will 
subject the purported bargain and what it entails. The second factor is whether or not 
a constitutional right is directly implicated. Although a constitutional right does not have 
to be implicated for a contractual term or its enforcement to be contrary to public 
policy, 292  if a constitutional right is directly implicated, the Court will subject the 
contractual term and/or its enforcement to a higher degree of scrutiny.293 
 
3. The two notions of deference compared 
 
My previous submission that Courts hold exercisers of private contractual power to 
higher standards than exercisers of public power is all the more interesting bearing in 
mind the differing explanations and justifications of deference for public and private 
law (or more specifically “contract law”) outlined above. Courts are more willing to 
depart from adherence to the principles that underlie contractual deference than they 
are to depart from adherence to the principles that underlie public law deference. The 
 
288 Beadica supra note 206 at para 90.  
289 Constitution, section 172(1)(a).  
290 See Barkhuizen supra note 169 at paras 59 and 65 – 66.  
291 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 20 at 31. 
292 Beadica supra note 206 at para 87 at footnote 200.  
293 See Bredenkamp supra note 190 at para 46 – 47 and Beadica supra note 206 at para 87.  
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Courts’ departure from the principles that underlie “contract law” deference appears to 
look very much like the “paternalistic intervention” that is normally a precept of a law 
of contract that is more collectivist in its conception.294 This is especially so as the 
willingness of the Courts to intervene will vary depending on the relative bargaining 
strengths of the parties and will be at its strongest when one of the parties is in a 
significantly less powerful position than the other. 295 It is also unsurprising that this 
pocket of paternalistic intervention in South Africa’s law of contract is inextricably 
linked with a pocket of South Africa’s contract law that is, in its form, standards based 
(result-orientated). 296  
 
This paternalistic intervention also explains and justifies why Courts do not accept 
similar reasoning and logic that results in the adoption of the institutional competence 
reason and justification for public law deference, in the sphere of private contractual 
relations. One would assume that individuals are best placed to judge what is in their 
best interests and regulate their own affairs. In fact, one would assume that individuals 
are better placed to regulate their own affairs than the various branches of the state 
are to make the decisions and choices that affect the public at large. Accordingly, one 
would assume that individuals have the “institutional competence” to make their own 
decisions and indeed, as stated above and as recognised by the Constitutional Court, 
recognising such acknowledges and respects individuals’ dignity. However, the 
paternalistic intervention described above is justified (and it is submitted unassailably 
so) on at least two grounds.  
 
The first is that it is constitutionally mandated. The Constitution shapes the common 
law and the common law derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to its 
control. 297 Public policy, which contracts are subject to, and which is informed by the 
Constitution, has been constitutionally imbued with the values of fairness, 
reasonableness, and justice.298 Accordingly, if the protection and attainment of those 
values require a paternalistic intervention by the Courts into contractual relations then 
 
294 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
295 C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 641. 
296 Alfred Cockrell op cit note 80 at 44, and C-J Pretorius op cit note 79 at 642. 
297 Beadica supra note 206 at para 71.  
298 Beadica supra note 206 at para 72.  
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that intervention is constitutionally mandated and obligatory. Although public policy 
has as a facet the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that principle is no longer 
axiomatically privileged over the other values that are found in South Africa’s public 
policy. 299 The second is that, in a society as unequal as South Africa (a fact that the 
Constitutional Court has taken judicial notice of),300 judicial intervention in aid of those 
who may be possessed of lesser bargaining power is justified.301  
 
It appears, therefore, that what best distinguishes the deference that a Court has to 
exercises of public power from the deference that a Court has to the exercises of 
private contractual power, is democratic principle.  When a Court approaches the 
question of whether or not it can intervene and/or second-guess the exercise of private 
contractual power, it does not do so on the basis that the individual exercising the 
power is clothed with democratic legitimacy, nor on the basis that the power wielder is 
democratically accountable to the electorate for the manner in which they wield that 
power. When approaching the manner in which an individual exercises a contractual 
power that they have, the Court cannot take refuge in the knowledge that there will be 
a second, and better suited, mechanism through which the person wielding the power 
will be held accountable for their actions, as a Court does when considering the 
exercises of public power. When it comes to the exercise of private contractual power 
(in the context of South Africa’s individualistic conception of contract law), the Court 
is, for lack of better phrasing, the last line of defence. Whereas when it comes to the 
exercise of public power, the last line of defence is the better suited and more 
appropriate electorate, who have the power to hold elected representatives to account 
in elections.  
 
 Legitimate governmental purpose  
 
A further factor to be considered when comparing the thresholds to which Courts hold 
exercises of public power (on rationality grounds) and exercisers of private contractual 
power (on public policy grounds) is that for an exercise of public power to be rational, 
 
299 Beadica supra note 206 at para 87.  
300 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59.  
301 Barkhuizen supra note 169 at para 59. 
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the exercise of the public power must be for a legitimate governmental purpose or a 
legitimate governmental objective.302 For any exercise of a public power to be rational, 
it must serve at least one legitimate purpose. 303 There have been no real judicial 
pronouncements on how to determine whether a purpose is a legitimate one304 and 
Courts will be called upon to make evaluative judgments. 305 Of course, although the 
threshold of lawful conduct set by public policy in the private contractual realm may be 
higher than that set by rationality in the public law realm, there is no requirement that 
any exercise of private law, to be lawful, be done for any purpose other than the power 
wielder’s own self-interest. Accordingly, even if a Court can only hold the exercise of 
a public power to a standard of rationality, implicit and necessary in that finding of 
rationality, is the finding that the public power has been exercised for a legitimate 
governmental purpose. This, it is submitted, is an explanation and justification for 
Courts holding the exercise of public power to a lower standard than the exercise of 
private contractual power. When determining whether or not to second-guess the 
manner in which the private power wielder has exercised its private contractual power, 
it will be borne in mind that the private contractual power is, more likely than not, acting 
in their own self-interest, whereas a wielder of public power is acting to further the 
attainment of a legitimate governmental purpose. Simply put, because a wielder of 
private contractual power can act for solely in the pursuit of their self-interest, the Court 
can scrutinise their conduct more closely so as to ensure that it is constitutionally 
compliant.  
 
That a Court will be more deferential towards a wielder of public power, on the basis 
of the democratic principle, and on the basis that for the exercise of public power to 
be lawful, it has to be exercised for a legitimate governmental purpose, is in 
accordance with South Africa’s constitutional make-up. As held by Mogoeng J, 
“[k]nowing that it is not practical for all fifty five million of us to assume governance 
responsibilities and function effectively in these three arms of the State and its organs, 
‘we the people’ designated messengers or servants to run our constitutional errands 
 
302 See Max Du Plessis & Stuart Scott ‘The Variable Standard of Rationality Review: Suggestions for Improved 
Legality Jurisprudence’ (2013) 130 SALJ 597.  
303 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 355.  
304 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 355. 
305 Alistair Price op cit note 49 at 355. 
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for the common good of us all.”306 As further recognised by the Constitutional Court, 
as a young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, it needs to be 
ensured that public power wielders can act efficiently and promptly. 307 
 
 Whose interests must be taken into account  
 
A final point to be made in relation to Courts holding the exercise of private contractual 
power (on public policy grounds) to a higher standard than the exercise of public power 
(on rationality grounds) is broadly in relation to whose interests need, in law, to be 
taken into account. This point can be made again with reference to the two scenarios 
mentioned previously.  
 
In Scenario 1, in accordance with Hohfeld’s conceptualisation as described by 
Cockrell,308 Y has a legal power vis-à-vis X, as X labours under a legal liability that its 
legal position is susceptible to change by Y. Put slightly differently, Y can change X’s 
legal position by enforcing the contractual provision, and holding X to the 6 month 
notice period. That Y’s power is a legal power is clear from the fact that Y can change 
X’s legal position by its mere act of enforcing its legal power. The change in X’s legal 
position occasioned by Y, is not dependent on any further natural causation effects: 
X’s legal position changes merely and only because Y exercises its legal power.  
 
Drawing further on the fictitious example, the position is different in relation to those 
members of the citizenry, who, owing to Y’s exercise of its legal power vis-à-vis X, 
cannot access alcohol and/or tobacco products (this class of person will herein after 
be referred to as “the Public”). Assume for example that X, a large tobacco and/or 
alcohol distributor who was renting a premise from Y, now cannot operate its business 
as it is without premises to operate from as it gave its notice to renew the terms of the 
lease late. Assume too that it is accepted that the Public have a right to be able to 
purchase tobacco and/or alcohol products. Y’s exercise of its private contractual 
 
306 United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC) at 
para 3.  
307 Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 
SA 91 (CC) at para 41.  
308 See Cockrell op cit note 20.  
57 
 
power affects the legal situation of the Public (by limiting and/or infringing on their right 
to purchase the products) causally, meaning that it is not merely and only Y’s exercise 
of its private contractual power that, in and of itself, changes the Public’s legal 
situation. For the Public’s right to be infringed there would need to be further natural 
effects. For example, an alternative distributor would not need to step in and/or X 
would not have to find alternative premises to operate from. It is only if either of those 
two effects occur, that the Public’s legal situation will change. There is a necessary 
(and perhaps lengthy) chain of causality that needs to be present for Y’s exercise of 
its contractual power to effect X’s legal situation. This is, of course, the hallmark of a 
non-legal power, or a power of influence, while the Minister’s power vis-à-vis the public 
in Scenario 2, is a legal power. This is so since if the Minister prohibits the sale of 
alcohol and/or tobacco products, without anything further needing to happen, every 
member of the Public’s legal situation will change, and it will be unlawful to purchase 
such products. There is no further chain of causality necessary for the public to be 
lawfully precluded from purchasing such products: it is the mere exercise of the 
Minister’s public power which makes such sale unlawful.   
 
There are at least two important consequences of this. The first is that as the power 
that Y has vis-à-vis the Public is not a legal power, the Public (as a general proposition 
at least) cannot challenge or seek to second-guess the manner in which Y exercises 
that power, assuming, of course, that the Public (or a member thereof) would have the 
requisite locus standi to even bring such a claim.   
 
The second is that when Y considers exercising its private contractual power, it is 
submitted that Y does not have to concern itself with the effect that the exercise of its 
private contractual power may have on the public. Indeed, there is nothing in the 
majority judgments in Barkhuizen or Beadica that indicates how, or whether at all, 
when determining whether or not an exercise of private contractual power is against 
public policy, the interests of persons not privy to the contract are to be taken into 
account. While ordinarily public policy considerations relate to the public interest, there 
is no sentiment expressed in Barkhuizen or Beadica that persons who are not privy to 
the contract ought to have their interests considered. Moreover, there is no guidance 
on whether, for those “interests” to warrant consideration, they would have to be more 
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than mere interests, and possibly a right or a legitimate expectation, founded in 
common law, elsewhere, or in the Constitution itself. Indeed, in both of those cases, 
neither of the parties seriously put before the Courts evidence in relation to how the 
power wielders exercise of their power would affect parties not privity to the contract. 
Nor, to put it simply, did the Constitutional Court “go there”. Both cases were argued 
and judged on the basis of the effects on the parties privy to the contract. If the 
Constitutional Court was seriously inclined to take into account the interests of the 
public at large (who are not privy to contract), it is inconceivable how the majority in 
Beadica could not have not reached a different outcome bearing in mind the common 
cause fact that the exercise of the Option would lead to the failure of an affirmative 
action scheme. Clearly, I submit, the authoritative position now, in light of Beadica, is 
that the effects are to be judged relative to those persons privy to the contract. This 
limitation on whose interests need to be considered, is another basis upon which the 
higher substantive standard that Courts hold exercises of private contractual power 
than exercises of public power is justified. When a public power is exercised, its 
rationality will (or can be) judged against a much broader scope of persons than the 
exercise of a private contractual power. I submit that it would be unjustifiable if Courts 
required exercisers of private contractual powers to take into account the effect that 
their exercise of their otherwise lawful power would have on the public at large and 
whether those effects are contrary to public policy as outlined above.  
 
 
 The tightrope: in what circumstances would the higher standard 
become unjustified  
 
I have argued that the standard that Courts hold an exerciser of private contractual 
power to, on public policy grounds, are higher than the standards that a Court holds 
an exercise of public power to on rationality grounds. I has also given reasons and 
explanations as to why, in the circumstances, such a position is justifiable. It will now 





Firstly, this position will become unjustifiable if the Courts recognise a “power of 
influence” as a legal power that is reviewable. If Courts begin holding persons who 
exercise private contractual powers liable for the causal effects that the exercise of 
their power has, wielders of private power will be unduly and unjustifiably constrained 
in the manner in which they can exercise their rights and powers. In this regard, it will 
be necessary for Courts to bear in mind that the only powers that the Court ought to 
concern itself with are legal powers, defined as powers that can the change the legal 
situation of another person non-causally. Courts ought not to, with reference the above 
mentioned fictitious example, allow the Public to found a cause of action against Y, for 
the effect that Y’s power of influence has affected them. Doing so would unjustifiably 
broaden the scope of consideration that a private power wielder has to have and imbue 
that private power with requirements ordinarily found in public powers.  
 
Secondly, this position will become unjustifiable if Courts lose sight of the fundamental 
distinction between a private and public power. As Austin put it, the only actual 
distinction that one can make between private and public law is that when a condition, 
or a power, is private, the powers vested in the person who may bear it “more 
peculiarly regard persons determined specifically” and when the condition is public 
those powers “more peculiarly regard the public considered indeterminately.”309 It is 
submitted that it would be the blurring of this line that would result in the currently 
justifiable higher standard Courts hold exercisers of private contractual power to 
(relative to exercises of private power) becoming unjustifiable. This is so, as it would 
require a wielder of private contractual power to consider the interests of the “public 
considered indeterminately” and ensure that their exercise of their power does not 
accrue consequences, that may be held to be contrary to public policy, for this 
indeterminate class of persons not party to the contract.  Requiring a wielder of private 
contractual power to do so, would impute a strictly public law requirement into their 
position as a wielder of private power.  
 
It should be recognised, however, that it is not axiomatic that Courts ought to maintain 
a stark distinction between public and private law, and not imbue into private 
 
309 Austin op cit note 23 at 774.  
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contractual relations all the various procedural and substantive requirements 
historically associated with public law. As was detailed above, many of the 
assumptions that have traditionally underpinned the distinction between private and 
public law no longer necessarily hold true.  Nowadays in private law relationships there 
will often be a significant inequity of bargaining power between the parties, and the 
relationships will be fundamentally unequal. Moreover, as was also outlined above, 
the distinction between private law and public law can be based on the ideological 
persuasion of a jurisdiction, which of course may change over time.  Accordingly, as 
South Africa pursues its constitutional project, South Africa’s jurisprudence may 
become increasingly collectivist and communal in its outlook. Indeed, many may argue 
that normatively this is the direction South Africa ought to go, and legally this is the 
route that South Africa’s jurisprudence has begun to follow. A more collectivist and 
communal underpinning of South Africa’s jurisprudence in general may lead South 
Africa’s jurisprudence closer to adopting the position that all law is public law, and 
regardless of whether a power is private or public, the power wielder must be 
conscious of the effects and/or influences that their exercise of their power may have 
on the public considered indeterminately, whose interests trump those of the individual 
power wielder. While normatively, such an argument may be appealing, in light of the 
majority judgment in Beadica highlighting the legal and socio-economic importance of 
many of the individualistic precepts that underpin South Africa’s contract law at 
present, it seems doubtful that at least for the time being, Courts will turn their backs 
on these traditional precepts, and disregard the fundamental difference between what 
private contractual power is and what a public power is.  
 
Accordingly, I submit that for it to remain justified that Courts hold the exercise of 
private contractual power (on public policy grounds) to higher standards than Courts 
hold the exercise of public power (on rationality grounds), the Courts ought not to hold 
a “power of influence” to be reviewable, and ought not to lose sight of the fundamental 
differences between a private and a public power. I submit therefore, that Courts are 
required to walk a tightrope. Courts have to both imbue South Africa’s contract law 
with Constitutional values, while at the same time ensuring that the higher standard 




One example of where the Court may arguably have made a ruling at the outer limits 
of the justifications for holding exercises of private power to higher standards than 
exercises of public power is the matter of Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Bank of Baroda310 (“Annex Distribution”). The facts of Annex Distribution were rather 
simple: twenty applicant companies which had links to the Gupta family (“the 
Companies”) sought an interim interdict against the Bank of Baroda, precluding the 
Bank of Baroda from terminating their banker-client relationship with the Companies, 
pending final determination of the validity or otherwise of the termination notices 
issued by the Bank of Baroda to the Companies. Albeit the Court’s main concern was 
with whether or not the Companies had made out a case for interim relief, the facts of 
the matter inextricably concerned contract, and as recognised by the Court, a Court is 
allowed to scrutinize the exercise of contractual powers on the basis of public policy. 
311 After finding that the Companies had established a prima facie right to a reasonable 
notice period and that despite the Bank of Baroda’s contentions to the contrary, there 
would be no irreparable harm to the Bank of Baroda should the interim relief be 
granted, the Court went on to reason, when considering the balance of convenience 
that:  
 
“The dispute transcends the parties’ commercial interests. It has a direct impact 
on the more than 7 600 workers, the majority of whom are Black unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers. They face a real prospect of losing their jobs if the 
applicants’ [the Companies’] businesses collapse. That prospect weighs heavily 
with me, more than the parties’ commercial interests.” 
 
Albeit the Court adopted this reasoning when dealing with a very specific requirement 
of very specific relief (i.e. the requirement of the balance of convenience in the context 
of an interim interdict), as stated above, the dispute between the parties was 
contractual in nature. It is submitted that it is not inconceivable that such reasoning 
will, or may, be transplanted into disputes regarding whether or not the exercise of any 
contractual power is compliant with public policy and therefore lawful. By means of 
 
310 (52590/2017) [2017] ZAGPPHC 639 (9 October 2017).  
311 Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd and Others v Bank of Baroda (52590/2017) [2017] ZAGPPHC 639 (9 October 2017) 
(“Annex Distribution”) at para 69.  
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example, it may have been argued (or it would have been open to the Companies to 
argue) –  at the hearing where the final determination of the validity or otherwise of the 
termination notices issued by the Bank of Baroda to the Companies was to be 
determined –  that public policy required that reasonable notice constituted sufficient 
time for alternative arrangements to be made so that there was no prejudicial and/or 
unfair consequence to the “workers” (as so described by the Court in Annex 
Distribution) as a consequence of the Bank of Baroda exercising its contractual rights 
to terminate its relationships with the Companies.  
 
Such an argument, if accepted by a Court, would, it is submitted, be an example of 
the Court incorrectly walking the hypothetical tightrope. This is so, as, in the first 
instance, it would constitute the Court recognising the Bank of Baroda’s “power of 
influence” vis-à-vis the workers as a legal (or other) power the exercise of which is 
subject to judicial review. As is clear, the Bank of Baroda had no legal power vis-à-vis 
the workers, as its exercise of its contractual power did not, in and by itself, change 
the workers’ legal situation. The workers’ legal situation would only be changed 
causally, if further natural effects followed, such as there being no alternative made. 
In the second instance, it would constitute the Court taking the view that the Bank of 
Baroda’s contractual power was a power that regarded the public indeterminately. This 
is so, as if the Bank of Baroda had (as a matter of law) to concern itself with the effect 
that its exercise of its contractual power had on the general public at large, it would 
have to take into account the effect of the workers, and the indeterminate list of those 
other persons whom may be effected. In the Court doing so, the Court would 
unjustifiably, I submit, hold the Bank of Baroda to a higher standard of conduct than 
expected of public power wielders (on rationality grounds), and, require the Bank of 
Baroda to essentially “handle” its power as if it is a public power, thus blurring the lines 
between what is a public and a private power, and what each requires. Doing so, it is 
submitted, would make the higher standard that a Court holds the exercise of private 
power to unjustifiable.  
 
Furthermore, and lastly, if a Court were to accept such an argument, the Court would, 
I submit, lose sight of the fact that the basis of contractual liability in South Africa (again 
premised on South Africa’s individualistic notion of contract law) is, as has been 
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demonstrated above, primarily consensus and the will theory. The main basis upon 
which a person founds contractual liability in South Africa is by means of consensus. 
One can assume that in Annex Distribution, there was never any consensus between 
the Bank of Baroda and the workers (and to the extent necessary the Companies), 
that the Bank of Baroda’s rights in terms of the various contracts entered into between 
it and the Companies, were subject to the caveat that they could only be exercised if 
such exercise accrued no unfair (or other) consequence to the workers. Indeed, as an 
important matter of practicality, it cannot be said that a contracting party, when 
entering into a contract with another person, reaches consensus with all other persons 
that may be effected by the manner in which that party exercises its private contractual 
powers. That liability that the Bank of Baroda would have laboured under (vis-à-vis the 
workers), or any liability that any contractual party may labour under brought about by 
the Court’s holding that that party’s exercise of its private contractual power is subject 
to it not unfairly or unreasonably or unjustly affecting any other person, cannot be 
founded on consensus and accordingly cannot be contractual in its nature. The only 
basis upon which such liability could be founded is public policy, not consensus. This 
of course, is a stark departure from South Africa’s traditional position which is (in the 
absence of a statute or some other law of general application) to impose liability on a 
party where they have either agreed to it, or have committed a wrong (in the law of 
delict).  Moreover, and importantly, this is not a case of public policy broadening or 
varying a liability that a person labours under. It is a case of public policy creating 
totally new liabilities and founding them on a party, who may have never contemplated 
having them. A discussion regarding whether or not such a liability is contractual or 
not is an important one, but is beyond the remit of this submission.  
 
As much of a departure as such a position may be, normatively, at least it is not 
axiomatic that liability (in the contractual sense) ought only to accrue to a party by 
means of consensus. A more communitarian or collectivist outlook to contract law may 
show persuasion towards a position wherein persons accrue liabilities even in the 
absence of consensus and on the basis that all individuals are joined by communal 
ties and are not separated by the determinant of consent.  While normatively, such an 
argument may be possible, jurisprudentially, particularly bearing in mind the majority 
judgement in Beadica highlighting the legal and socio-economic importance of many 
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of the individualistic precepts that underpin South Africa’s contract law at present, it 
seems doubtful that the Courts will have scope to impute liability onto persons owing 
to their proximity to a contract and their position in the community.  
 
 Keeping balanced on the tightrope  
 
It would be remiss to point out that Courts have a tightrope to walk, without providing 
any submission in relation to how Courts are to walk this tightrope. In this regard, I 
submit that the Courts can make use of another fundamental principle of South Africa’s 
contract law, namely, privity of contract as their “balancing tool” while walking this 
tightrope. The idea of privity, or the privity of contract, as a general rule provides that 
“contracts bind those who are party to them and parties who are not privy to an 
agreement have no contractual remedy against the contracting parties.” 312 Put slightly 
differently, “only parties to a contract are bound by it and concomitantly are able to 
enforce it”. 313 Privity of contract, in the South African common law rests on the Roman 
Dutch notion of a contract as a “vinculum iuris”, which creates rights and duties only 
for the parties bound thereby. 314 Simply put, the notion of privity of contract entails 
that if A and B enter into a contract, a third person, say C, cannot claim to have any 
rights in terms of the contract entered into between A and B. 315 The only means by 
which C would be able to gain any sort of right in this situation is if A and B concluded 
what is known as a contract for the benefit of a third party. Sufficient for current 
purposes, and debate on the issue aside,316 if A and B contract so as to extend a 
benefit to C, and C accepts that benefit and performs any corresponding obligation, C 
will have a right to that benefit. 317 The primary basis of C’s right to the benefit however, 
is still consensus between the parties. The principle of privity of contract would provide 
a Court with a means through which to argue, with reference to Annex Distribution by 
means of an example, that unless the contract between the Bank of Baroda and the 
 
312 J. R. Midgley ‘To What Extent Should Third Parties Have Contractual Rights? A South African Perspective’ 
(1993) 42 (1) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 136, at 137.  
313 Andrew Hutchison and L Siliquini-Cinelli ‘Beyond Common Law: Contractual Privity in Australian and South 
Africa’ (2017) 12 (1) Journal of Comparative Law 49 at 49.  
314 Andrew Hutchison and L Siliquini-Cinelli op cit note 313 at 63.  
315 J. R Midgley op cit note 312 at 145.  
316 There is debate as to whether, essentially, when C accepts the benefit there are one or two contracts in play. 
For a recent submission thereon see R Van Zyl ‘Die Oorsprong En Ontwikkeling Van Die Stipulatio Alteri Tot ‘n 
Suiwer Verklaring in Hedendaagse Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2)’ (2018) 81 THRHR 543.  
317 See A Hutchison and L Siliquini-Cinelli op cit note 313 at 64.  
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Companies included a provision for the benefit of the Workers, which was accepted 
by the Workers, and the Workers took up any corresponding obligation, the Workers 
would have no right or entitlement to enforce the contract(s) between the Bank of 
Baroda and the Company. In upholding the principle of privity of contract, a Court 
would ensure that an exerciser of private contractual power need not consider the 
interests an indeterminate class of persons not privy to the relevant contract, to whom 
a benefit has not expressly been extended and who have not expressly accepted it. 
Furthermore, so as to avoid holding powers of influence to be reviewable, a Court can 
reason that the powers the exercise of which are reviewable, are only the powers 




VI. CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
 
My undertaking in this submission, it is submitted, has been a novel one, and has 
fundamentally been about the difference and distinction between public and private 
law. More work is certainly required for the arguments set out herein to be developed 
and better formulated. Perhaps and for very good reason, matters of private law and 
matters of public law possibly ought not to be so directly compared. Nevertheless, 
what I have argued is that, justifiably, the standard that Courts hold the exercise of 
private contractual powers to on public policy grounds, is higher than the standard that 
Courts hold the exercise of public power to on rationality grounds, and that, in order to 
remain balanced on the hypothetical tightrope, Courts can have recourse to the 
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